Journal of International Business and Law
Volume 12 | Issue 1

Article 5

2013

Not So Safe Haven: Reducing Tax Evasion by
Regulation Correspondent Banks Operating in the
United States
Michael A. Berger

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Berger, Michael A. (2013) "Not So Safe Haven: Reducing Tax Evasion by Regulation Correspondent Banks Operating in the United
States," Journal of International Business and Law: Vol. 12: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol12/iss1/5

This Notes & Student Works is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of International Business and Law by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Berger: Not So Safe Haven: Reducing Tax Evasion by Regulation Corresponde

NOT SO SAFE HAVEN: REDUCING TAX EVASION BY
REGULATING CORRESPONDENT BANKS OPERATING IN THE
UNITED STATES
MichaelA. Berger*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"[I]n this world nothing is certain but death and taxes." 1 However, for some only
death is certain. As long as there have been taxes, wealthy individuals have sought loopholes
to protect their fortunes and evade taxes. Tax evasion by wealthy individuals is perhaps the
greatest financial crime the United States ("U.S.") has known. For the most part the public
remains in the dark to its existence, reading the occasional fictional tale in a John Grisham
novel, but the truth is far more frightening. As a result of individual tax evasion the U.S.
loses an estimated $100 billion in tax revenue each year.3 Where does this money go? The
answer, is numerous tax havens located around the globe. Countries all over the world lose
tax revenue from wealthy patrons moving money overseas. 4 In 2005 the Tax Justice Network
estimated that the total worldwide value of offshore holdings was around $11.5 trillion.5

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. I would first like to thank my
family, my parents and brothers, for all of their unwavering support throughout the writing and editing process.
I would also like to thank Professor Frank Gulino for helping me select this topic and providing guidance
throughout the writing process. To Professor Ronald J. Colombo, for assisting in discovering a plausible
solution to the problem of tax evasion. Finally, I would like to thank the staff of the Journalof International
Business & Law for giving me this opportunity and preparing this Note for publication.
1 Benjamin Franklin. (1706-1790), BARTLEBY.COM, http://www.bartleby.com/100/245.html (last visited Sept.
1,2012).
2 Lynnley Browning, Swiss Banking Secrecy, Under Pressure, Shifts
to Singapore and Hong Kong, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2010, at B3 [hereinafter Browning, Swiss Banking Secrecy], available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23swiss.html?pagewanted=all.
3
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GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, STAFF REPORT 1 (2008)
[hereinafter
TAX
HAVEN
BANKS],
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/

071708PSIReport.pdtattempt-2. Further reflecting the extent of this global problem, it is estimated that this
$11.5 trillion held offshore leads to $255 billion in unpaid taxes. Sam Hinton-Smith, The Offshore World,
OPEN DEMOCRACY (Mar. 21, 2006), http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalizationvision-reflections/
offshore 3375.jsp. These figures solely reflect individual tax evasion. If corporations that evaded taxes were
factored in the numbers would be much larger. For example, an economist at the Treasury Department
estimated that Apple would have paid $2.4 billion more in federal taxes for the year ending 2011. Charles
Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2012, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.coml2012/04/29/ business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-andnations.html?pagewanted=all.
4 See generally Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 2669, 1 12 'h Cong. (2011) (proposing a solution to the
problem of tax evasion by wealthy individuals).
5 NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: UNCOVERING THE DAMAGE OF OFFSHORE BANKING AND TAX

HAVENS 28 (2011). This value of $11.5 trillion is close to the Gross Domestic Product of the U.S. and a
quarter of all global wealth. The Tax Justice Network is an independent organization that was created by the
British House of Parliament to increase awareness about offshore finance and document the effects of tax
evasion and tax havens. The organization is composed of academics, accountants, economists, and lawyers
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While tax evasion is a global problem that plagues economies, not all economies get
the short end of the stick. Some nations even aspire to become tax havens for the influx of
capital, which fuels growth in their financial industry.6 Alternatively, this growth has allowed
these tax havens to prosper during a period of widespread economic decline.
The onshore countries face reduced revenue collected by the government and a shift
in the burden to the middle and lower classes to pay higher taxes.8 In the U.S., numerous
remedies have been proposed ranging from bilateral and multilateral treaties among countries,
to unenacted legislation, to the formation of international organizations. 9
Despite these efforts, the offshore financial industry has only grown. 10 In 2008,
there was a breach and weakening in bank secrecy in Liechtenstein and Switzerland, two well
known tax havens. However, even these breaches have failed to stem the growth of tax
evasion.1" Nevertheless, lessons can be learned from these events that can help dissuade the
use of tax havens.
Part II of this Note will provide an introduction into tax havens and address the
recent setbacks tax havens have had in maintaining the secrecy of their clients' identities.
The analysis will focus on two of the most influential breaks in tax haven governance, the
revelation of Liechtenstein Global Trust (hereinafter "LGT") client identities in Liechtenstein
to German authorities and the recent disclosure of UBS clients in Switzerland to U.S.
authorities. 12 These disclosures provided the impetus needed to begin prosecuting and

among others. About Tax Justice Network, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/
front content.php?idcatartr103&lang-1 (last visited Sept. 1,2012).
6

Timothy V. Addison, Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 IMD. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 703, 711

(2009). The Island of Jersey, one such tax haven, estimates that 80% of its governmental revenue is obtained
through taxing foreign corporations. Charles Recknagel, Will G20 Crack Down on Tax Havens?, RADIO FREE
EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1566041.htm.
7 See Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens?, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 1 (2006), http://www.nber.org/papers/w12802.pdf.
8 Levin, Coleman, Obama Introduce Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, LEVIN.SENATE.GOV (Feb. 17, 2007),
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=6413b85a-2bb4-41b8-8adc-d7e574f6d84a.
Senator Levin
has led a campaign against tax havens. Based on the estimate of $100 billion being lost yearly due to the use of
tax havens, Levin stated that "[w]e cannot tolerate tax cheats offloading their unpaid taxes onto the backs of
honest taxpayers." Although efforts have been made to curb this abuse the problem still exists today, almost 5
years since Levin made the statement. Id. Whereas "offshore" is the movement of money across borders,
"onshore" is the country where the domiciled person pays taxes domestically. SHAXSON, supranote 5, at 12.
9 See H.R. 2669 (explaining the recent measures taken by the U.S. to combat the offshore abuses of wealthy
individuals). See also Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harnfultaxpractices/taxinfornationexchangeagreem
entstieas.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (explaining some of the initiatives taken by the OECD). The obvious
answer would seem to be that the developed countries which are losing all of this investment should lower their
tax rates. However, lowering the tax rate would only lead tax haven nations to subsequently lower their tax
rates and induce a race to the bottom. The result would be lower taxes and perhaps less offshore accounts, but
would also lead to a decrease in revenue and an inability to invest in areas such as education and healthcare.
Addison, supranote 6, at 709-10.
10Nicholas Shaxson defines "offshore" as "the artificial movement or use of money across borders, and about
the jurisdictions, commonly known as tax havens, that host and facilitate this activity." SHAXSON, supra note
5, at 12 (emphasis in original).
1 See generally TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3 (describing the case histories in Liechtenstein and
Switzerland).
12UBS AG is a company that was formed in 1998 after a merger between the Union Bank of Switzerland and
the Swiss Banking Corporation. Currently UBS is not an acronym, but the official company name. See UBS,
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investigating bankers and individuals evading taxes. 13 These two studies reveal the
possibility that legislation can substantially reduce the number of wealthy Americans hiding
money in offshore accounts. Part III will address the current regulations for monitoring tax
evasion, both in the U.S. and abroad, analyze their ineffectiveness, and discuss why a new
solution to the problem of tax evasion is required. Part IV proposes the implementation and
enforcement of legislation that should regulate foreign bank subsidiaries doing business
within the U.S. The tax haven system as a whole cannot be stopped. However, through
penalizing onshore bank subsidiaries, the incidence of tax evasion can be shifted away from
the U.S.
I.

HISTORY

Tax havens are countries that offer no or nominal tax rates to foreign investors.14
Typically, tax havens are small countries with small populations, but a high standard of
living. 15 Additionally, the countries usually have an efficient government that is both
financially and politically stable. 16 Tax havens also have a lack of transparency with other
countries. 17 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter
"OECD") states that transparency is needed to "ensure[] that there is an open and consistent
application of tax laws among similarly situated taxpayers."' 8 This is done to confirm that
the correct tax liability is applied and multinational entities do not face double taxation.
Another criterion of tax havens is the effective exchange of pertinent tax information between
the two governments engaged in an exchange agreement. 19 This is typically reflected by the
use of bilateral treaties signed between the two countries.20 The final criterion is an absence
of a requirement that the financial activity be substantial."

Frequently Asked Questions Corporate lnjbrmation, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/about-ubs/investor_
relations/faq/about.html (ast updated Nov. 9, 2011, 9:11 AM).
13 See generally TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the investigations of certain individuals
evading taxes by creating accounts in Liechtenstein and Switzerland).
14 Tax Haven Criteria, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmfultaxpractices/taxhavencriteria.htm
(last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
Another
definition of a tax haven is a place "that seeks to attract money by offering politically stable facilities to help
people or entities get around the rules, laws, and regulations of jurisdictions elsewhere." SHAXSON, supranote
5, at 11.
15Dharmapala & Hines Jr., supra note 7, at 1.
16Id. Countries that control corruption and have political stability are more attractive to investors who value
secrecy and security. See also TAx HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3, at 34 (describing the characteristics that make
Liechtenstein attractive to investors). Liechtenstein has touted itself as a location of "[e]conomic and political
stability," with a record of success in asset management and structuring and "[s]trict laws on professional
secrecy for banks and trustees." It also emphasizes protection of assets from "undesirable access" through
"[d]iscretion and anonymity." All of these characteristics that it emphasizes are those of a tax haven and those
that attract wealthy individuals to use this country in particular. Id.
17Tax Haven Criteria,supra note 14.
"SId. The OECD was formed in 1961 and currently has 34 member countries that strive to improve the
"economic and social well-being of people around the world." About the Organisationfor Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.oed.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
19 Tax Haven Criteria,supra note 14.
20 Id. This factor coupled with the lack of transparency has been heavily analyzed by comparing countries
around the world. The Tax Justice Network has created a financial secrecy index. A secrecy jurisdiction is
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The main draw of tax havens is the absence of taxes that would otherwise be paid in
a person's domiciled country.22 The U.S. taxes domestic income of its citizens as well as
income earned abroad.23 Conversely, many countries offer more generous tax laws; the
United Kingdom taxes only domestic income. 24 Tax haven countries have even more
favorable tax policies, for example lower tax rates. Therefore it is not surprising that wealthy
individuals will pursue avenues that preserve their fortunes and patronize banks in those
countries. The resulting economic growth of these tax havens is sustainable because the
lower taxes are offset by an increased tax base, 2hence
the widespread growth of tax havens
5
even during times of global economic instability.
Liechtenstein and other tax havens offer wealthy individuals lower tax rates and, for
the most part, remove the fear of prosecution. 26 This is primarily attributed to two reasons.
First, in Liechtenstein tax evasion is not a criminal offense.27 Under Liechtenstein law, it is
legal for wealthy individuals from foreign countries to deposit their money in Liechtenstein's
banks. Despite the obvious problems this network of tax havens creates, it is virtually
impossible to shut down. Countries that operate as tax havens do not have a legal distinction
between tax evasion and tax avoidance.28 Since the laws of these countries do not consider
tax evasion illegal, there is no obligation to help other countries obtain the relevant
another term for tax havens. Financial secrecy, according to the Tax Justice Network, is when there is a reffisal
to share this pertinent financial information with legitimate authorities that require it to properly tax individuals.
Bank employees in these secrecy jurisdictions maintain clients' secrets or face criminal penalties for revealing
those secrets. See Tax Justice Network, Introducing the 2011 FinancialSecrecy Index, FINANCIAL SECRECY
INDEX, http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012). Switzerland is at the top of the list
and avoids sharing information with other governments. See Giles Broom, Switzerland Leapfrogs U.S. to Top
FinancialSecrecy List, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/201110-04/switzerland-leapfrogs-u-s-to-top-financial-secrecy-list.html.
21 Tax Haven Criteria,supra note 14.
22 Dharmapala & Hines Jr., supra note 7, at 4.
23 Phil Cain, Underworld: The Lure of a Liechtenstein Bank Account, GLOBAL POST (Feb. 9, 2011, 7:14
AM),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/commerce/1 10208/liechtenstein-bank-secrecy-tax-havens.
24 id.

25Dharmapala & Hines Jr., supra note 7, at 4-5.
26But see David Voreacos, Ex-UBS Banker Martin Lack Is Indicted in Tax Conspiracy Case, BLOOMBERO
(Aug. 2, 2011, 3:11 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-02/ex-ubs-banker-lack-charged-withconspiring-to-help-americans-evade-taxes.html [hereinafter Voreacos, Ex-UBS Banker] (providing an example
of the recent shift by U.S. authorities to prosecute private bankers); see TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3, at
105 (stating that Mr. Olenicoff was being prosecuted for his role in evading U.S. taxes).
27 Nick Mathiason, A Journey from Haven to Hell, THE OBSERVER, Mar. 2, 2008, at 4, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/mar/02/tax.personalfinancenews.
Recently however, the U.S. has
prosecuted private bankers and individuals who have unlawfully evaded taxes.
21 See David Crawford, Tax Havens Pledge to Ease Secrecy Laws, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009, at Al,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123685028900906181.html.
In the U.S., tax avoidance is
considered legal whereas tax evasion is illegal. Judge Learned Hand described tax avoidance as "[a]ny one
may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which
will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." Helvering v. Gregory, 69
F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). Tax evasion is the use of illegal measures to avoid paying taxes that one lawfully
owes. It "involve[s] an individual or corporation misrepresenting their income to the Internal Revenue
Service." Cornell University Law School, Tax Evasion, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:25
PM), http://www.law.comell.edu/wex/tax-evasion. In Switzerland, the laws refer to tax evasion as merely a
misdemeanor and not a serious crime that mandates an exception to the secrecy laws. Carolyn Michelle Najera,
Combating Offihore Tax Evasion: Why the United States Should Be Able to PreventAmerican Tax Evaders
From Using Swiss Bank Accounts to Hide Their Assets, 17 SW. J. INT'L L. 205, 217 (2011).
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information required to properly investigate and prosecute individuals evading taxes
domestically.29 Furthermore, Liechtenstein law does not require disclosure of its financial
holdings to other countries.30 The result is the ability to enter into exchange agreements with
other countries where the Liechtenstein government has the discretion to reveal as much or as
little information as it desires.
Second, bankers often structure transactions so deposits pass through multiple
entities before reaching the desired account making it difficult for tax authorities to determine
the beneficiary.3 ' This problem is farther exacerbated by offshore banks, such as UBS and
LGT, seeking out wealthy U.S. citizens to secure more business and earn greater profits.32
Recent studies show that employees of these offshore banks encourage wealthy individuals to
open accounts and then structure the accounts so that they are not disclosed to U.S.
authorities. 33
Traditionally, tax haven bank secrecy has been airtight. 34 Attracting wealthy
individuals is extremely competitive and a bank's reputation for privacy is paramount in

29 Crawford, supra note 28. Switzerland defines tax evasion as "the underpayment of taxes that results from a
passive neglect to report income." Since the Swiss have an efficient financial system, a hallmark of tax havens,
the ability to evade taxes is very difficult and not considered to be a criminal offense as a result. See Spencer

Daly, Secrecy in Limbo: What the Most Recent Settlement with the IRS Means for UBS and the Rest of the
Swiss Banking Industry, 10 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 133, 143 (2011). In fact, the Swiss Federal Constitution goes
even further. It provides every person with the right to privacy in their financial affairs. As such, it states that
anyone associated with a bank is restrained from divulging any information acquired while within the scope of
his employment. The punishments provided, up to 3 years in prison and a steep fine, will usually convince
bankers to abide by the laws even after their employment is terminated. See Bank-Client Confidentiality, Swiss
BANKING, http://www.swissbanking.org/en/bankkundengeheimnis.htm (last visited Sept. 2,2012).
30 Mathiason, supra note 27. Similarly, Switzerland through UBS has sent a letter to clients saying in
substance that the bank will not provide the Internal Revenue Service with any information about U.S. clients,
provided that the account does not have any U.S. securities. This protection extends to clients even if they are
U.S. taxpayers who are obligated to report the income to the Internal Revenue Service. TAX HAVEN BANKS,
supra note 3, at 10.
31 Jaclyn H. Schottenstein, is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: A CriticalReview of Bank Secrecy Law, Tax
Evasion and UBS, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 351,364 (2010).
32 SHAXSON, supra note 5, at 26-27.
Switzerland is known for seeking out clients from countries
geographically proximate such as Germany, France, and Italy. Whereas Australians use tax havens closer to
home such as Vanuatu. Americans and Latin Americans tend to use the Caribbean. India is estimated to lose
close to $7 billion each year from tax evasion, most of it from Mauritius, a small island in the Indian Ocean.
This loss is the result of Mauritius targeting wealthy investors by lowering tax bills and targeting wealthy
clients. See Megha Bahree & Deborah Ball, Island Tax Haven Roils India's Ways, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2012,
at Bi, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444327204577615924257597492.html.
Information has come to light disclosing the practices of UBS in obtaining wealthy American clients. UBS
bankers made regular trips to the U.S., close to 300 visits between 2001 and 2008, and organized events
designed to attract wealthy individuals, sometimes meeting with 30 or 40 clients per trip. The bankers
minimized the contact in the U.S. that could lead back to them such as e-mails, faxes or phone calls. See TAX
HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 11-14.
33 TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3, at 3. These employees are governed by laws that enforce banker-client
privilege. Any information that is acquired in the course of business with the client is privileged and kept in
strict confidence. Under Swiss law, bankers are subject to criminal action if they divulge information about the
client. Schottenstein, supra note 31, at 355-58.
34 In the past this included criminal activities, but since September 11, 2001, countries have been more willing
to divulge information to avoid directly funding terrorist activities. See Mathiason, supranote 27.
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obtaining business.35 Recently, there was a disclosure of clients' names which opened the
door to increased probing into the client lists of offshore banks. This alone will not cause a
decline in the use of tax havens, however, it has contributed to relaxation of bank secrecy
laws.36 The recent break in secrecy combined with the global economic downturn has placed
significant international pressure on tax havens to stop protecting the rich at the expense of
the global economy."
A.

LGT and Liechtenstein

Liechtenstein is a great example of a country whose characteristics are illustrative of
a typical tax haven. 38 The population is well under one million and has a very high Gross
Domestic Product per capita: ranking first in the world, thus fulfilling the wealth
requirement.39 It represents the typical values of a successful tax haven, "a place where trust
and secrecy are perhaps more valuable than mere money." 40 Foreign countries must go
through a strict process to request information about banking clients. 4' Information cannot be
requested by just "throwing a dart at the wall," there must be some reasonable basis for the
requested information.42
LGT, the primary financial institution in Liechtenstein, is owned by the
Liechtenstein royal family. 43 LGT operates subsidiaries all over the world, including
countries such as Austria, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland."
LGT also
operates a
45
financial institution called LGT Capital Partners (USA) Inc. located in the U.S.

35 See Martin A. Sullivan, Lessons from the Last War on Tax Havens, TAX ANALYSTS (July 30, 2007),

http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/ArticlesF3AA 8739FOEFF008525744B0066459B?OpenDocu
ment. Reputation is considered to be the biggest factor in determining whether a tax haven will be able to
compete successfully against its peers. The country seen with the strongest image for security and stability will
prevail. See id.
36 Browning, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 2. The settlement between the U.S. and banks in Switzerland
has had a limited effect on the offshore banking industry. Wealthy Americans still keep their money in
offshore banks; the location is the only thing that has changed. Instead of looking immediately to Switzerland,
the rich are now moving east to Singapore and Hong Kong. This shift may signal a change from the traditional
European dominance of tax havens. In Asia, the investment has been increasingly American and European,
signaling a desire to leave Europe. In Singapore, the laws are similar in that they protect the privacy of
investors who are legitimate and not trafficking illicit goods. It is estimated that Switzerland's offshore wealth
is in the range of $2 trillion, while Singapore's is around $500 billion and Hong Kong's approximates $200
billion. All this suggests that the offshore banking industry is not declining in power but rather shifting its
focus from Europe to Asia. Id.
17 Crawford, supra note 28. The focus of this crack in bank secrecy relates to the evasion of
taxes by wealthy
individuals. Most tax havens have lifted secrecy regulations when offshore banks are used to hide money
acquired from illegal activity. Disclosure became even greater after the September I1h terrorist attacks. Id.
38 See supra text accompanying notes 14-21.
39 Central Intelligence Agency, Liechtenstein, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-fatbook/geos/ls.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2012).
40Mathiason, supra note 27.
41Cain, supranote 23.
42See Michael J. Bums & James McConvill, An UnstoppableForce: The OJJ hore World in a Modern Global
Economy, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 205,216 (2011).
43 TAX HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 32.
44 Id. at 33.

45 Id. at 33-34.
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Liechtenstein is estimated to hold close to £130 billion ($206 billion) of foreigner's
money.46 It attracts investment by touting its "'[e]conomic and political stability,' '[h]ighquality financial services,' '[d]ecades of tradition in asset management and asset structuring,'
'a liberal legal framework,' and '[s]trict laws on professional secrecy for banks and
trustees.' ,7 However, its status as a flourishing tax haven suffered a substantial setback in
2002 when data archivist, Heinrich Kieber, stole and sold a CD that contained a list of clients
who were evading taxes in their home countries.48
Heinrich Kieber was a data archivist at the LGT subsidiary LGT Treuhand.49 He
disclosed the names of over 1,250 clients of the 77,000 account holders at LGT. 50 The
information divulged was estimated to be related to financial investments of close to C3.5
billion ($4.6 billion).5 ' After making copies of the disc, he offered to sell the information to
the United Kingdom Inland Revenue; the offer was declined.5 2 Germany, however, did not
decline the offer. The German Secret Service purchased the disc for £4.2 million ($5.5
54
million).5 3 Kieber is currently thought to be living in Australia under an assumed identity.
He is subject to an arrest warrant from Interpol for theft, fraud, and counterfeiting.5 5 He is
also subject to criminal
penalties in Liechtenstein for revealing confidential information in
56
violation of the law.
This breach allowed Germany to recover some of the money it had lost over the
years through evaded taxes by some of its wealthiest individuals; it also caused many wealthy
patrons to seek alternatives to Liechtenstein for hiding their money.5 7 Not only did Germany
recover some of the money, but the authorities also made high profile arrests of prominent
58
German businessmen.
Germany was not the only country to recover assets as a result of this breach in
security. The United Kingdom and Liechtenstein agreed to terms leading to the disclosure of

Mathiason, supra note 27.
47 TAX HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 34.
48 Mathiason, supra note 27.
46

49 Lucy S. Lee & Stafford Smiley, Focus on Offshore Bank Accounts: The Liechtenstein and UBS Agreements,

36 WGL-CTAX 34,36 (2009).
50 Mathiason, supra note 27.
51 Lee & Smiley, supra note 49, at 36.
52 Mathiason, supra note 27.
53 id.
54 id.

" Cain, supra note 23.
56 Mr. Kieber is subject to criminal penalties for violating Article 14 of the Banking Act which states that
"[t]he members of the organs of banks and their employees as well as other persons acting on behalf of such

banks shall be obliged to maintain the secrecy of facts that they have been entrusted to or have been made
available to them pursuant to their business relationships with clients. The obligation to maintain secrecy shall
not be limited in time." As the law suggests, the scope of this banker-client privilege extends to all employees

of the bank, including data archivists. As a result of breaking Liechtenstein law, a website was created that
offers a reward in the sum of $7 million for any information that leads to the arrest of Mr. Kieber. TAx HAVEN
BANKS, supra note 3, at 35, 80.
57 See Mathiason, supra note 27. It is estimated that Germany has recovered about f1.8 billion ($2.4 billion) in
unpaid taxes. Cain, supranote 23.
58 Anthony D. Todero, The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act: A Unilateral Solution to a Multilateral Problem, 19
MNN. J. INT'L. L. 241, 256 (2010).
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British held accounts in exchange for lenient penalties.5 9 Since this agreement, Great Britain
has recovered close to £3 billion ($4.75 billion) in unpaid taxes. 60 In the U.S., authorities
have used the disclosed information to determine that LGT has used practices that assist
wealthy Americans inevading U.S. taxes.61
Upon the release of clients' names, the U.S. discovered that most of LGT's clients
had substantial ties to the U.S. 62 It stands to reason that prior to the breach the U.S. had no
idea who the potential tax evaders were and therefore, could neither prosecute nor investigate
these individuals' finances. However, once the U.S. had this basic information, such as
biographical data, it could ask Liechtenstein to release information on specific individuals
suspected of committing a crime under U.S. law.63 Even with this information there is no
guarantee that it will fall under the Tax Information Exchange Agreement (hereinafter
"TIEA") the U.S. has with Liechtenstein. 64 When probed for assistance after the breach, LGT
refused to cooperate and provide information about the accounts, citing violations of
Liechtenstein secrecy laws. 65 This included refusal to disclose information about the number
of U.S. clients that have opened accounts with LGT, the amount of U.S. money held in LGT,
or the percentage of the accounts disclosed compared to the total number of accounts. 66
Since the dissemination of the clients' names, the U.S. has obtained information
about the operations of LGT and its employees.67 LGT employees assisted U.S. clients by
advising them to open accounts with Liechtenstein foundations. 68 These foundations allowed
the bank to shield the identity of the beneficiaries from U.S. authorities and therefore protect
the assets within each account from taxation. 69 In addition, the employees would structure the
'9Cain,supra note 23. About 12 other countries have made similar progress in investigating individuals who
opened bank accounts in Liechtenstein. These countries include Italy, France, Spain, and Australia. TAx
HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 2.
61 Cain, supra note 23. The Prime Minister of Liechtenstein, Klaus Tschuetscher, hopes to replicate the British
agreement with other countries and thereby force banks to conform to international regulations. See Emma
Thomasson, Liechtenstein Now Safe Haven Not Tax Haven-PM, THE EUROPEAN (May 23, 2012, 11:54 AM),
http://www.the-european.eu/story-596/liechtenstein-now-safe-haven-not-tax-haven-pm.html.
61 TAx HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 32.
62 Id. at 34. Client connections to the U.S. include citizenship, permanent residency, employment, real estate,
and immediate relatives in the U.S. Id.
63Addison, supranote 6, at 722.
6 For example, under the terms of the treaty with Liechtenstein disclosure is required for tax fraud by "means
of intentional use of false, falsified, or incorrect business records, provided the tax due is substantial."
Confidentiality of Tax Havens: Information Exchange, ISLA OFFSHORE ADvTSOR, http://www.islaoffshore.com/going-offshore/tax-havens-information-exchange/ (last updated May 14, 2012).
65 TAx HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 34-35.
66 Id. at 35. The failure to disclose this kind of statistical information prevents the Internal Revenue Service
from having an idea of how many Americans are evading taxes. See id. at 37.
67 See id. at 4-5.
61 Id. at 4.

69 Id. Having a bank account in the name of a Liechtenstein foundation transfers the appearance of ownership

from someone who is an entity of the U.S. and subject to U.S. tax law to a foreign entity that is not responsible
for filing paperwork with the Internal Revenue Service. The Marsh account is just one example of a case the
subcommittee investigated of a U.S. citizen holding his money in a Liechtenstein foundation. In the Marsh
case, multiple Liechtenstein foundations were opened to store over $49 million dollars. The foundations were
listed as having contingent beneficiaries and therefore no taxes had to be filed with the Internal Revenue
Service because there were no U.S. beneficiaries. In order to maintain secrecy, the employees of LGT took
steps to conduct business in Liechtenstein and not leave a paper trail in the U.S. After being investigated,
Marsh had to pay back taxes of close to $3 million. Id. at 37-42.
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accounts to avoid the Qualified Intermediary (hereinafter "QI") requirements that mandated
disclosure of certain accounts. 0 Actions by the employees of LGT show that the bank was
not merely a conduit of illicit activity conducted by U.S. citizens, but rather a willing
participant and possibly even an instigator.
Despite the public blow to Liechtenstein's reputation for secrecy, it remains a
profitable tax haven. After the scandal broke, the Liechtenstein government issued a
statement that reaffirmed its position on bank secrecy and publicly expressed outrage that
another sovereign nation would purchase stolen private financial information and disclose it
to the public.7 '
The response by the Liechtenstein government reveals an insight into the future of
bank secrecy. First, the government has every intention of retaining its secrecy laws and will
look to strengthen its resolve to avoid such disclosures in the future. Second, any solution to
reduce individual tax evasion by U.S. citizens in foreign countries must be established
through a route that avoids Liechtenstein authorities. Finally, in order to avoid a standstill in
investigating specific clients, information must come from within Liechtenstein. The Internal
Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") cannot investigate clients based on the information it
currently possesses. For Liechtenstein to adhere to the TIEAs, the IRS must show that it has
some basis for the requested disclosure.7 2
B. UBS and Switzerland
Switzerland has been the primary focus of bank secrecy and tax havens for
decades.7 ' For this reason, it serves as a perfect case study on bank secrecy. Emphasizing
bank secrecy and having a reputation as a country that protects its clients' identities has
allowed Switzerland to become "the world's biggest offshore banking center., 7 4 As a result
of this reputation, UBS has attracted large numbers of wealthy Americans to open accounts in
Switzerland.75 UBS estimated that as of 2008 it had approximately 20,000 accounts from

Id. at 32. The Marsh account also provides an opportunity to understand how LGT was able to avoid the
Qualified Intennediary reporting requirements. After Liechtenstein had signed the Qualified Intermediary
agreement with the U.S. pledging to disclose the relevant tax information, LGT employees met with Mr. Marsh
and explained the options he had to avoid these reporting requirements. Subsequently, Mr. Marsh consented to
removing his investments in U.S. securities and transferring them to investments in Europe. This transfer
allowed LGT to report the Marsh account as falling outside the Qualified Intermediary reporting requirements
and not disclosing the accounts to the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 41-42. A Qualified Intermediary serves
as a way to disclose information about foreign accounts to the pertinent authorities in an information exchange.
See infra Part III.A.
70

71 TAX HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 80.
72 TIEAs are bilateral agreements reached between the governments of two countries, for example
Liechtenstein and the U.S., to exchange information regarding bank's client information. See infra Part lI.B.
73 Emma Thomasson, Swiss Banks Tout Stability and Secrecy to Lure Rich, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2011, 10:58
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-banks-switzerland-idUSTRE7943FW20111005.
74 Id.

75 TAX HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 8.
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Americans, almost 19,000 of which remained undeclared to U.S. authorities. 76 The estimated
worth of these accounts was slightly less than $18 billion.77
UBS is one of the largest banks in Switzerland. 7' Another is Credit Suisse, which
has also been under investigation for assisting U.S. clients evade taxes. 79 As part of its
operations, UBS serves private and corporate clients by offering wealth management,
investment banking, and asset management services.80 UBS operates in over fifty countries
including the U.S., where 37% of its employees work. 8 ' However, as a result of recent legal
troubles, Switzerland's position at the top of the offshore banking world has become a bit
82
more precarious.
In 2007 Bradley Birkenfeld, a UBS private banker turned whistleblower, voluntarily
provided documentation to the U.S. concerning tax evasion by wealthy U.S. clients.8 3 Among
the information provided were the identities of some American citizens who maintained
private accounts with the bank. 4 These American citizens owned close to 19,000 undeclared
accounts with an estimated value of $18 billion.8 5 Instead of86 the U.S. collecting taxes on that
$18 billion, it generates UBS close to $200 million per year.
Similar to LGT, UBS instructed its employees in methods that allowed the bank to
hide private clients' accounts from the IRS. s7 U.S. clients were told that if they did not invest
88
in U.S. securities then the accounts would avoid the QI requirements and avoid disclosure.

76

Id. at 9. The data received from UBS suggests that the undeclared accounts contain more money and were

more profitable for the bank than those that were declared. Id. at 85.
77 Id. at 9-10. Birkenfeld signed a Statement of Facts for the U.S. government that claimed UBS had "$20
billion of assets under management in the United States undeclared business, which earned the bank
approximately $200 million per year in revenues." Id. at 10.
78 Banking, SWrSSWORLD.ORG, http://www.swissworld.org/en/economy/keysectors/banking/
(last visited

Sept. 2, 2012).
79 Lynnlcy Browning & Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Probes 8 03"Jhore Banks for Aiding Tax Evasion, REUTERS

(Sept. 20, 2011,
7:05 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/20/us-offshorebanksidUSTRE
78J30E20110920. Markus Walder, the former chief of North American offshore banking for Credit Suisse was
brought up on charges of conspiring to defraud the government by helping Americans evade taxes. Credit
Suisse reached an agreement with German authorities to pay $200 million as part of a settlement for assisting
German citizens in evading taxes. See also Trefis Team, Credit Suisse Settles with German Authorities to
Clear Overhang, TREFIS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.trefis.com/stock/cs/articles/75232/credit-suisse-settleswith-german-authorities-to-clear-overhang/2011-09-26.
8o UBS in a Few Words, UBS, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/about-ubs/about-us/ourprofile.html
(last
modified Aug. 29,2012,11:58 AM).
s1 Id. UBS is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. See Schottenstein, supra note 31, at 379.
82 Browning, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 2.
83 TAX HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 9.
84 id.

85 David Spencer, Cross-Border Tax Evasion and Bretton Woods 11 (Part2), 20 J. INT'L TAX 45, 48 (2009).
86 TAX HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 10.
87 In a letter to U.S. clients, the bank bragged about its secrecy by explaining that the bank faced the possibility
of sanctions by a Swiss regulator should privacy laws be violated. UBS also stated that it has operated offices
in the U.S. since 1939 and has been subject to the risk of U.S. authorities claiming jurisdiction over assets
booked abroad, but has successfully navigated these risks. See id. at 87. Other methods of hiding the client's
accounts include holding client mail in Switzerland and shredding all documentation after the client views the
information. UBS even claims to have laptops that are programmed to receive encrypted messages that
allegedly could not be accessed by U.S. customs. Id. at 98-101.
88 Id. at 10-11. As a benchmark to explore the full effect of UBS's operations, the subcommittee investigating
UBS determined that U.S. clients sold over $2 billion worth of U.S. securities in 2001 alone. This was done
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Birkenfeld testified that when meeting with U.S. clients it was not necessary to explain the
relationship between the Swiss bank accounts and paying taxes. He stated that not having to
pay taxes was "[c]learly understood" by the U.S. clients. 8 9 UBS actively targeted U.S. clients
by setting up events in the U.S. that were designed to attract wealthy Americans. 9" The
reason for focusing on wealthy Americans was because, as one UBS document so eloquently
put it, "31% of World's UHNWIs [Ultra High Net Worth Individuals] are in North America
(USA + Canada)." 91 The U.S. has 222 billionaires that contribute to a worth of over $700
billion. 92 As a business operating to make a profit, it is understandable that UBS would focus
on acquiring American business.
Birkenfeld provided a look behind the veil of Swiss bank secrecy into how UBS did
business with U.S. clients. Igor Olenicoff, a UBS client with whom Birkenfeld worked
closely, provides a good example of the relationship between a UBS banker and an American
93
client. Mr. Olenicoff, a U.S. citizen, made billions of dollars in the real estate market.
When his relationship with Birkenfeld began, Olenicoff created accounts in numerous tax
havens under the names of offshore corporations. 94 Despite knowing that the beneficiary of
the accounts was a U.S. citizen, the accounts were not disclosed to the IRS as was required
under U.S. law. 95 Over time, Olenicoff used Birkenfeld's advice to adjust his accounts in
order to evade taxes and maintain anonymity. 96 As a result of providing this information and
assisting the IRS, Birkenfeld was arrested while in the U.S. for his involvement in tax
evasion. 97 He pled guilty to conspiracy to evade taxes with Olenicoff.98 Throughout his

just to avoid the QI reporting requirements. The money was then reinvested in assets that did not mandate
disclosure to U.S. authorities. In a letter to clients, UBS states that even if it knows that the client is an
American taxpayer, the bank will not reveal the information despite being obligated to do so under U.S. law.
See id. at 87.
'9 Id. at 97.
90Id. at 11-12. These events included art fairs, performances by the UBS Vervier Orchestra and yachting
events. During the UBS bankers' trips to the U.S., every precaution was taken to avoid a paper trail that could
lead back to the client or the bank. For example, bankers were not to use any U.S. emails or make any phone
calls in the U.S. to discuss a client's accounts. Id. at 12.
9'Id. at 97.
92 Id.
9'Id. at 104.
94 Mr. Olenicoff subsequently brought suit against UBS AG stating that defendants "'carefully crafted
investment scheme' to defraud Plaintiffs, thousands of other investors, and the United States Treasury
Department out of hundreds of millions of dollars in fees, costs, and taxes." Olenicoffv. UBS AG, No. SACV
08-1029 AG (RNBx), 2009 WL 481281, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009); see also David Voreacos, UBS Sued
by Billionaire Who Pleaded Guilty in Ofthore Tax Scam, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2008, 5:23 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=arpCAztLLmU (stating that Olenicoff, who
pled guilty to tax violations, was lured into using an offshore account under the guise that his actions complied
with U.S. law). As a result of the U.S. investigating him, Olenicoff paid $52 million to the U.S. for the taxes he
evaded as well as penalties imposed for breaking the law. Id.
95 See TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3, at 106; see also Report of Foreign Bank and FinancialAccounts
(FBAR), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=148849,00.html (last
updated Aug. 14, 2012) (explaining when accounts located in a foreign country should be disclosed to U.S.
authorities).
96 TAX HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 106.
97Id. at 9; see also Indictment, United States v. Birkenfeld, No. 08-60099, 2008 WL 2113269 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
10, 2008) [hereinafter Birkenfeld Indictment] (stating that Birkenfeld is a U.S. citizen and therefore subject to
jurisdiction of U.S. courts).
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business dealings with Olenicoff, Birkenfeld hid $200 million worth of assets in Switzerland
and helped Olenicoff evade $7.2 million in taxes. 99
Birkenfeld's disclosure of clients' names has led the U.S. government to clamp
down on offshore tax evasion.100 Eight banks are under criminal investigation for their roles
in assisting U.S. citizens evade taxes by moving money overseas.0 This comes after UBS
paid $780 million in penalties for assisting wealthy Americans in evading taxes and released
the names of 4,450 American clients who had been patronizing UBS. 102 The original
agreement also required the Swiss Justice Department to reveal the names of American clients
who were suspected of tax fraud and had over 1 million Swiss francs in their accounts. 0 3
Despite UBS's willingness to cooperate, Switzerland has taken measures to 04
prevent UBS
from disclosing the pertinent information; it would be in violation of Swiss law. 1
After UBS agreed to the disclosure, some 30,000 clients voluntarily declared the
presence of offshore accounts to gain amnesty from prosecution. 10 5 The Voluntary Disclosure
Program provided the incentive of reduced penalties and a lower likelihood of criminal
prosecution. 0 6 The IRS estimates that this led to a collection of almost $2.7 billion in back
0 7

taxes.1

C.

Effect on Bank Secrecy

Although bank secrecy has not ended as a result of these two breaches, there have
been far reaching ramifications.
i.

IndictingBank Employees

After Birkenfeld was indicted, Raoul Weil, head of UBS's Wealth Management
business and CEO of the U.S. cross-border business and worldwide private banking division,

98 See generally Birkenfeld Indictment, supra

note 97 (listing the charges that Birkenfeld faced).

The

indictment alleges that Birkenfeld "unlawfully, willfully and knowingly, did combine, conspire, confederate
and agree... to defraud the United States and an agency thereof, to wit, the Internal Revenue Service of the
United States Department of Treasury, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371." The methods
taken by Birkenfeld, such as creating shell companies and advising clients to destroy offshore banking records,
explain how he was able to avoid disclosure to U.S. authorities. Id.
99 TAX HAVEN BANKS, supranote 3, at 83.
10oSee Browning & Stempel, supranote 79.
101 Id.
102 Id. The $780 million fine resolves the civil and criminal allegations. The fine is made up of $380 million
of profits from illegal acts and the remaining $400 million represents the lost tax revenues faced by the U.S.
See Daly, supra note 29, at 147. The revelation of the 4,450 American client names may seem like a win for
the U.S., but the original lawsuit demanded the names of 52,000 Americans holding offshore accounts. Najera,
supranote 28, at 209.
103 Najera, supra note 28, at 208-09.
114

Id. at 209.

105

Browning & Stempel, supra note 79. Voluntary disclosure has been defined as "willful correction of past

mistakes to the IRS before being caught." U.S. citizens that have flocked to voluntarily disclose their offshore
accounts will not be subject to criminal charges for tax evasion. See Daly, supranote 29, at 149.
"m Najera, supra note 28, at 210.
107 Browning & Stempel, supranote 79.
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was charged with conspiracy to defraud the U.S. of income taxes.'
The indictment alleges
that Weil was involved in increasing the profits of UBS at the expense of the U.S.
government by assisting wealthy American clients evade taxes. 10 It also alleges that the UBS
bankers who targeted wealthy American clients reported to Weil.' 0 Weil allegedly provided
incentives for the bankers to obtain more business, knowing that it was in violation of the
reporting requirements under U.S. law."' If convicted, Weil faces a maximum of five years
in prison and fines of $250,000. 112 After the indictment was alleged, UBS released a
statement that "UBS entities based outside the U.S. will discontinue offering cross-border
private banking services to U.S. clients.""' 3
In furtherance of the U.S. approach to reducing bank secrecy, Martin Lack, a former
banker and head of UBS's North American business, was charged with conspiracy to defraud
the U.S." 4 The IRS has developed a trend of charging private bankers with conspiracy to
defraud the U.S. in hopes that each banker will reveal more information about U.S. clients
and slowly open the vault of Swiss bank secrecy. " 5 Lack marks the second Swiss national in
a top position to be indicted by U.S. authorities.1 6 The indictment alleges that Lack not only
used UBS to hide assets, but also patronized Swiss cantonal banks. 17 Additionally, he
allegedly encouraged his clients not to take advantage of the voluntary disclosure program
which would have limited the penalties faced for tax evasion. 18

108Spencer, supranote 85, at 51.
'9 Id.; see

also Indictment, United States v. Weil, No. 08-60322, 2008 WL 4898212 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2008)

[hereinafter Weil Indictment] (alleging that Weil "unlawfully, willfully and knowingly, did combine, conspire,
confederate and agree... to defraud the United States... in the ascertainment, computation, assessment and
collection of federal income taxes").
119Brian Baxter, DOJ Charges UBS Wealth Management Head with Aiding Tax Fraud,THE AM LAW DAiLY
(Nov. 12, 2008, 2:01 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/1 1/breaking-doj-ch.html; see also
Weil Indictment, supra note 109 (stating that Weil was involved in creating incentives to reward those
employees who increased cross-border business with the U.S.).
. Carlyn Kolker, Ex-UBS Executive Raoul Weil Declared a Fugitive by U.S. Judge, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14,
2009, 00:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=aSEvhPR7Ok6A. In addition
to providing incentives to bankers, Weil was also involved in training the bankers to avoid being detected by
U.S. authorities during the business trips to the U.S. See Well Indictment, supranote 109.
112 Kolker, supra note 111.
113 Baxter, supra note 110.

114Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker indicted On Charges of Providing Tax Evasion Services to Wealthy

Americans, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.conm/2011/08/02/usindicts-ex-ubs-banker-tax-evasion n 916341 .html [hereinafter Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Indicted].
15 See id. Credit Suisse has reported that it was notified by U.S. officials that many of its bankers were
indicted after the bank came under scrutiny for allegations of criminal conduct.
116Id.; see also Kevin Gray, Ex-UBS Banker Sentencedfor Aiding U.S. Tax Evasion, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2011,
5:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/18/us-usa-tax-ubs-idUSTRE7AHJ920111118 (discussing
the charges that Lack faces). After his indictment was filed, the U.S. deemed Lack a fugitive. The U.S. can
only exercise jurisdiction in limited circumstances. All U.S. citizens hiding money offshore are subject to
jurisdiction of the U.S., as well as bankers who are U.S. citizens. However, the issue is a bit more obscure
when the bankers are Swiss nationals. See Browning, Ex-UBS BankerIndicted, supranote 114.
17 Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Indicted, supra note 114. Swiss cantonal banks are financial institutions whose
major stakeholder is the canton in which the bank is located. Banking, supra note 78. As a result of their
relationship with each canton, the banks are protected by the Swiss government and considered to be some of
the safest banks in Switzerland. Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Indicted, supranote 114.
118See Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Indicted, supranote 114; see also Voreacos, Ex-UBS Banker, supranote 26
(explaining that Lack discouraged his clients from patronizing the amnesty program).
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ii.

Efforts to Increase Transparency

During the recent global economic recession, the pressure on tax havens and their
wealthy clients has intensified." 9 As tax haven activity becomes a more mainstream issue,
tax havens are responding by slowly opening up to the public. 120 Despite pledging to increase
121
cooperation with foreign governments, tax havens have been slow to change their ways.
Switzerland recently reached an agreement with Great Britain to tax the money held
in its banks by British citizens. 122 This comes after a similar deal was reached with
Germany. 123 The effect of this deal is expected to net the British government close to £5
billion ($7.9 billion). 24 Although the clients' names will still remain protected under
the
25
agreement, this effort reflects a change in the bank secrecy environment from the past. 1
The German agreement with the Swiss banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, required the
banks to pay $2.6 billion as part of a settlement offer. 12 6 This settlement was the result of
wealthy German citizens holding 200 billion Swiss francs in Swiss bank accounts that
remained free from German taxation. 27 A major benefit of the deal for Swiss banks is that
private client information does not have to be released. 128 In fact, a recent court decision all
but guarantees the protection of client information. 129 A Swiss court decided on April 5, 2012
that Credit Suisse would not be permitted
to release account data of American clients because
3
it is protected under a tax treaty.' 0

"9 See Crawford, supra note 28.
id.
121See generally id. (discussing the promises made by tax havens to ease secrecy laws).
122Trouble Island: PublicAnger and Shareholder Unease Threaten Tax Havens' Tranquility, THE ECONOMIST
120

(Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21532264.
123 id.
124 id.
125 id.

126 Swiss to Pay 2 bin Sfr for German Tax Deal-Paper, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/07/swiss-tax-idUSL6E7J704B20110807.
Germany was closer to 10 billion francs. Id.
127

5:28 AM),

The original figure sought by

id.

128 Id.

129 David Jolly, Swiss Court Ruling Hampers a Tax Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2012, at B5, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/business/global/swiss-court-decision-snarls-effort-to-reach-us-tax-

deal.html? ril. The decision is based on the regulations of the TIEA. See infra Part II.B. The Swiss court
determined that the Internal Revenue Service requested information that was overly broad and the bank could
not properly identify the individuals in question. This adheres to the international norm that a treaty country
may "decline the request to exchange information" when it would violate that country's domestic law. JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3 1-11, EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO THE INCOME TAX TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND 43 (2011) [hereinafter PROTOCOL TO THE INCOME TAX

TREATY], available at http://www.jct.gov.

Despite this court ruling, Swiss banks have disclosed the names of
some of their employees to U.S. authorities. This disclosure violates Swiss law and is of little value since many
of the employees are not suspected of being linked to tax evasion. See Anita Greil & Marta Falconi, Swiss
Banks Share Names With U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2012, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10000872396390443713704577601473375807822.html.
130 Jolly, supra note 129.
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Liechtenstein has also faced mounting pressure and has pledged to ease bank
secrecy laws in response.'
By promising to ease secrecy laws, the tax havens hope to be
removed from the OECD "blacklist." 13 2 Although these exchange agreements suggest that the
countries are cooperating, in practice the results are not as clear. Jeanette Schwamberger,
spokesperson for the German government, said it best when she announced, "[w]e don't care
what Liechtenstein or Andorra say; it is action that counts."' 33
Although these actions appear on the surface to represent change, banking secrecy is
still a growing industry. Louay Al-Doory, the head of global business development at Reyl &
Cie, a Swiss wealth management firm, stated that he is "not worried at all about Swiss
banking, about its long term viability, growth and ability to ride through this storm."' 3 4 This
statement has been confirmed by Pierre de Weck, head of wealth management at Deutsche
Bank, by noting that Switzerland has more than made up for lost market share in Europe by
tapping the expanding economies of Asia and the Middle East.' 35 This rejuvenation of sorts
comes after UBS experienced a large scale
abandonment of wealthy private banking clients
36
following the recent tax evasion scandal.
It appears clear from the recent indictments and promises to become more
transparent that the revelation of client information from whistleblowers has slowed the
offshore industry. 37 However, the current measures will not be sufficient to ensure that the
industry does not weather this storm.
III.

CURRENT INITIATIVES TO DETER TAX EVASION

The U.S. taxes its citizens on their worldwide income. 13 The IRS mandates that 1as
39
a U.S. citizen "you must report income from all sources within and outside of the U.S.',
140
Failure to report income that is earned abroad or maintained in accounts abroad is a crime.
Currently, the U.S. has many different laws and treaties that are designed to regulate the
taxation of foreign income and investigate individuals who evade paying these taxes. To date
they have proven largely unsuccessful in reducing offshore tax evasion.

131 Crawford,

supra note 28. Andorra, a tax haven on the OECD "blacklist," also pledged to lower its secrecy

laws. Belgium, another country with strict bank secrecy laws, claimed to be moving to automate tax
information exchange. Id.
132

Id.

133

Id.

134 Thomasson,

supranote 73.

135id.

136Deborah Ball & Goran Mijuk, UBS Foresees Slender Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2011, at C3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970204612504576610010757886624.html.
137

See generally UBS, ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2010) [hereinafter UBS, ANNUAL

REPORT],

available at

http://www.ubs.com/globa/en/about-ubs/investor relations/annuareporting/2010.html (follow "Annual report
2010" hyperlink) (stating that UBS experienced outflows from its Wealth Management business during the
years of Birkenfeld's indictment). The losses were attributed to the damage to UBS's reputation and decline of
the cross-border private banking business. Id.
138 Income from Abroad is Taxable, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://wwwirs.gov/Businesses/ncome-fromAbroad-is-Taxable (last updated Aug. 3, 2012).
139

Id.

140

See id.
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A.

Qualified Intermediary Program

The Qualified Intermediary Program (hereinafter "QI Program") was designed to
facilitate the transfer of information between countries and banks. 141A QI is defined as "an
eligible person that enters into a QI Agreement with the IRS.' ' 142 Under this program, "[a] QI
generally assumes certain documentation and withholding responsibilities in exchange for
simplified information reporting for its foreign account holders.' ' 143 The intended result of
this program was to identify and disclose the accounts of American clients that derive wealth
from the U.S. and attempt to hide it overseas. 144 Transparency among banks would
theoretically increase by requiring the reporting of income that consists of source dividends
and interest along with other fixed income.1 45 The disclosing party can be either a foreign
financial institution,
a foreign branch of a U.S. financial institution, or a foreign corporation,
46
among others. 1
However, foreign banks are not going to just disclose this information, there must be
an incentive. This incentive is the ability to determine the level of withholding taxes, thereby
making it easier to comply with the QI requirements. 147 The intended benefit of this policy is
a reduction in the prior requirements placed on banks engaging in business with customers
148
holding U.S. securities.
As of 2001, both UBS and LGT took steps to enter into a QI
14 9
Program with the IRS.
Still, private bankers can easily avoid the QI Program's disclosure requirements.
Employees of UBS and LGT, as well as any other bank operating under a QI Program, could
structure the assets in an account to avoid the reporting obligations. 50 For example, one of
the terms of the QI Program is that "the IRS authorizes the QI to act as a QI but does not
obligate it to do so." 5 ' As such, private bankers may adopt the QI qualifications to remove
the stigma and negative effect on a bank or country's reputation and then simply avoid the
reporting requirements; effectively maintaining the status quo. 112 The IRS would have no
cause of action as no violation occurs. Yet Swiss bankers undermine the QI Program and

141

Schottenstein, supra note 31, at 372.

http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/Intemational-Businesses/Qualified-Internediary-Frequently-Asked-Questions (last updated Aug. 2,
2012).
143 Lee & Smiley, supra note 49, at 36.
144See Schottenstein, supra note 31, at 372.
142 Qualified Intermediary Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,

145See Qualified IntermediaryFrequentlyAsked Questions, supranote 142. The income that is not included in

the reporting requirements includes interest on deposits made with other banks if the money remains on deposit
for two weeks or less, original discount from a sales transaction that was completed within two weeks, among
some others listed in Treas. Reg. Section 1.6049-5(b)(7), (10), (11). Source dividends and interest are a form of
determinable income. Id.
146 id.
147

Schottenstein, supra note 31, at 373.

148 Id.

149 Spencer, supranote 85, at 49.
150Id. In the UBS case, private bankers informed their U.S. clients that by selling U.S. securities, the QI

obligations could be avoided and the accounts could remain undisclosed. See TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note
3, at 88.
151QualifiedIntermediaryFrequentlyAsked Questions,supra note 142 (emphasis added).
152See generally Crawford, supranote 28 (discussing the promises made by tax havens to ease secrecy laws).
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continue to aid the evasion of taxes.' 53 As a result, the QI Program is ineffective in reducing
tax evasion by wealthy U.S. citizens.
B.

Tax Information Exchange Agreements

The TIEAs are bilateral agreements signed by countries to exchange information in
an effort to curb tax evasion.1 54 The benefit of a TIEA is that the exchange of information
covers both criminal and civil tax issues. 155 This is significant as tax evasion is not
considered a criminal act in many tax havens. 156 An exchange agreement limited to criminal
matters would focus on money laundering and not reach wealthy clients moving money
offshore. In a TIEA, an authority representing each nation will make a formal request for the
57
disclosure of pertinent information regarding a specific case that is being investigated. 1
Typically, the information being requested is held by a bank or financial institution.' 58
As a bilateral instrument, each nation has the ability to structure each TIEA to meet
its desired needs. For example, Liechtenstein has a TIEA with numerous countries and
discloses information relating to criminal tax matters.' 59 It places such restrictions in the
agreements as no direct access to bank information and requiring a court order for
disclosure. 16 Switzerland, on the other hand, provides no access for civil issues, allowing
bank secrecy rules to be broken only in the event of tax fraud but not tax evasion. 161
Exchanging information through bilateral agreements has the drawback of giving tax havens
more power in negotiating each particular agreement, which leads to minimal disclosure. 162
Numerous conditions, as provided for within the contractual language of the TIEAs,
must be met before any disclosure. First, the requesting country must have exhausted all
possible avenues in seeking this information. 163 This obstacle can pose a significant barrier
because often the information required is located with the foreign bank. 164 Without the
assistance of other countries, the U.S. would not have enough information to effectively
investigate citizens suspected of tax evasion. 165 Second, certain privileged information is

TAx HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3, at 88.
154Lee & Smiley, supra note 49, at 34. To be deemed in compliance with the OECD requirements and remove
the stigma of being uncooperative, a country must sign 12 TIEA agreements. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG.
'53

RESEARCH SERV., 2009 WL 5529581, THE OECD INITIATIVE ON TAX HAVENS 10 (2009).

Testimony of Treasury Acting InternationalTax Counsel John Harrington Before the Senate Finance
Committee on Offihore Tax Evasion, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY (May 3, 2007),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp385.aspx.
155

156 See

id.
Schottenstein, supra note 31, at 371-72. This means that a shot in the dark will not be permitted. The
requesting authority must have a specific investigation in mind and request information relevant to that case.
See id.
158 Lee & Smiley, supranote 49, at 35.
'57

'59
160

Confidentialityof Tax Havens: JnjbrmationExchange, supranote 64.
id.

161 Id.

162 Tax havens negotiate and structure each TIEA so that the exchange of information is regulated by its

domestic law. Laura Szarmach, Piercingthe Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United States' Settlement in
the UBS Case, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 409,420-21 (2010).
163Schottenstein, supra note 31, at 371.
164See Addison, supra note 6, at 717-18.
165See Lee & Smiley, supra note 49, at 34.
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protected and cannot be disclosed. 166 Third, there must be a "well-grounded" belief that there
is a connection to fraudulent taxing practices. 167 As such, the IRS cannot simply "go fishing"
in an attempt to discover a U.S. citizen with a bank account in Switzerland. TIEAs are a tool
for investigating specific instances and are not for exploratory investigation to uncover tax
evasion. Fourth, and most importantly, countries are permitted to deny the request for
information. 16 One listed reason for denying a request is because it would be against public
policy.169 Maintaining the secrecy of clients is one of the strongest beliefs among citizens in
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and other tax havens, erecting another barrier of protection from
17
disclosure.
As such, the IRS faces an informational deficit necessary to get the investigation
started, but is unable to acquire any because it is stored in a foreign country that will not
disclose it without the evidence they hope to uncover, often resulting in a Catch-22. The U.S.
has recently amended the tax treaty, but this new version also suffers from drawbacks. It will
reportedly make it easier to identify tax evaders by forcing Swiss entities to disclose
information on taxpayers who show certain "behavioral patterns.' 171 This kind of boilerplate
language provides the Swiss banks with the opportunity to argue that certain instances do not
fall under the "behavioral patterns.' 72 Despite this obstacle, the IRS has found a temporary
solution to this problem.
C.

Whistleblowers

The IRS encourages whistleblowers by awarding the informant up to 30% of the
amount the IRS collects as a result of their information. 173 Under the whistleblower
provisions the informant must expose people who "fail to pay the tax that they owe. ' , 174 By
definition, anyone who is hiding their money in an offshore account with the intent of paying
reduced taxes is failing to pay the tax they owe.
However, there are a few limitations to this program. The people who would be
whistleblowers are often the private bankers that the U.S. has already begun to prosecute for

166 Id.

at 35. This includes information that is covered under the attorney-client privilege as well as trade
secrets.
167 Bums & McConvill, supra note 42, at 216. As a result of these conditions, the standard OECD TIEAs serve
little purpose and are often ineffective. See David Spencer, Cross-Border Tax Evasion and Bretton Woods II
(Part6), 20 J. INT'L TAX'N 44,50 (2009).
168Lee & Smiley, supranote 49, at 35-36.
169 Id.
170See Mathiason, supranote 27.
171Laura Saunders & Goran Mijuk, Swiss Amend U.S. Tax Treaty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2012, at C3, available

at http://onhne.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970204276304577263710813499528.html.
172See id.

173Whistleblower- Informant Award, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Whistleblower--Informant-Award (last updated Aug. 23, 2012). Birkenfeld was recently awarded $104 million in a
whistleblower payout, representing 26% of the $400 million UBS paid to the IRS. Despite receiving this very
generous payoff, Birkenfeld still had to serve a 40 month sentence, which he is currently finishing up in home
confinement. This award, given to a felon, indicates the IRS's determination to increase pressure on tax
evasion. Laura Saunders & Robin Sidel, Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2012, at C1,
availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10000872396390444017504577645412614237708.html.
174Whistleblower- Informant Award, supra note 173.
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aiding tax evasion.175 The incentive for this group of whistleblowers is avoiding prison time
rather than collecting 30% of the recovered assets.
The effectiveness of using whistleblowers has produced varied results. Bradley
Birkenfeld offered to raise the curtain on Swiss banking by disclosing personal contact
information for private bankers and wearing a wire to meetings. 176 Despite this generous
offer, the Department of Justice did not follow through. 177 As a result, it represented a missed
opportunity to conduct1 78an investigation that could have disclosed the names of U.S. clients
hiding assets offshore.
On the other hand, since Birkenfeld, the U.S. has indicted other bankers and pulled
the curtain a bit further back on bank secrecy. 179 The biggest break came when UBS banker
Renzo Gadola made a deal with the U.S.8 0 Gadola, similar to Birkenfeld, assisted American
citizens in evading taxes.1 81 With his cooperation, the U.S. was able to prosecute two private
bankers who participated in assisting tax evasion and learned a great deal about U.S. clients
hiding assets abroad. 182 In addition to bringing to light new information about tax evasion,
Gadola testified against these bankers.183 Under the terms of the plea agreement, Gadola had
to appear at "such grandjury proceedings, hearings, trials, ' and
otherjudicial [sic] proceedings,
84
and at meetings, as may be required by the United States.'
Thanks to his cooperation and feelings of remorse, Gadola avoided prison time and
received five years probation.' 85 His prosecution led to the end of his twenty-five year
banking career and likely his ability to live in Switzerland. 186 Although agreeing to a deal
175 See supra Part I.C.

176 Ken Stier, U.S. vs. Swiss Tax Cheats: A
Whistleblower Ignored, TIME (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1960391,00.html.
177 See Defendant Bradley Birkenfeld's Motion to Extend Report Date For Purposes of Continued Cooperation

With U.S. Government Authorities and For Hearing On Reconsideration of Sentence, United States v.
Birkenfeld,
No.
08-60099-CR-ZLOCH
(S.D.
Fla.
2009),
available
at
http://www.kkc.com/files/Mtn%20to%2Delay%2Greporting%2Date%2OFINAL%203%20with%2OGovt%2
Position.pdf. The motion states that Mr. Birkenfeld is ready to cooperate with the government and willing to
assist any investigations against UBS clients. Despite this offer, the government has yet to make contact with
Mr. Birkenfeld or even ask him "a single question about UBS, Swiss private banking, or any of Mr.
Birkenfeld's former U.S. clients." Id.
178 See Stier, supra note 176.
179 See supra Part I.C.i.
180 See David Voreacos & Susannah Nesmith, Ex-UBS Banker Gadola Avoids Prison.for Helping Tax Cheats,
BLOOMBERG BUsiNEsswEEK (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-20/ex-ubs-bankergadola-avoids-prison-for-helping-tax-cheats.html; see also Plea Agreement, United States v. Gadola, No. 1020878-CR-KING, 2010 WL 5474189 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2010) [hereinafler Gadola Plea Agreement] (stating
the terms of the plea agreement entered into by Mr. Gadola).
181See Voreacos & Nesmith, supranote 180.
182 Mark Daly, an attorney for the Justice Department described Gadola's participation as "extremely helpful"
and said that Gadola "went through client by client, colleague by colleague, laying out their participation in tax
evasion schemes." Id. Additionally Gadola recorded conversations he had with clients to assist in the
investigation. Gray, supranote 116.
183 See Gadola Plea Agreement, supra note 180; see generally Voreacos, Ex-UBS Banker, supra note 26
(stating that Gadola conspired with Martin Lack, who was indicted for conspiracy, from 1995 to 2008 and then
cooperated with prosecutors).
184 See Gadola Plea Agreement, supra note 180.
185 See id. The terms of the plea agreement mandate the U.S. to recommend a lighter sentence based on Gadola
recognizing that he did something wrong and taking personal responsibility for his actions.
186 See Voreacos & Nesmith, supra note 180.
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with Gadola was effective in revealing information about tax evasion committed by both
bankers and American citizens, its long term viability is limited. In order to maintain
peaceful terms with Switzerland and other tax havens, the U.S. will not be able to continue
prosecuting Swiss citizens and then providing them with immunity, effectively stealing
confidential information in violation of Swiss law.
D.

Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative

The Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative was created to persuade U.S. citizens
to voluntarily disclose their offshore accounts prior to discovery by the IRS. 187 The incentives
include reduced penalties in the form of lower fines and the possibility of avoiding criminal
prosecution in return for revenue.188 When a tax amnesty is implemented, the expectation is
that there will be "a substantial windfall" from the collection of previously evaded taxes.' 89
In addition to the substantial windfall, the citizens now paying taxes join the tax base and
contribute to future tax revenues. 19 The advantage of this type of program is that it turns an
adversarial system into one of cooperation. Traditionally, it has been a game of chess; private
bankers adapt to the new requirements and structure accounts to avoid disclosure prompting
the IRS to come up with new ways to reach the accounts.' 9' The benefit of the voluntary
disclosure window is that it provides certainty to the citizens evading taxes. For those who
come forward during the voluntary disclosure periods the penalties are reduced. The
alternative, continuing to evade taxes, may lead to harsh penalties and criminal prosecution. 192
This program has been utilized in the past with mixed results. Under the 2003
version, taxpayers who came forward had the benefit of avoiding civil fraud, criminal
prosecution, and penalties, but still had to pay back taxes plus interest. 193 In 2009, the
program was amended, but once again focused on reducing the criminal and civil penalties. 194
With over 14,000 voluntary disclosures, the success of the 2009 version is credited to an
increased ability of the U.S. government to identify and investigate individuals who have
offshore accounts. 19' This is the result of the prosecution of Bradley Birkenfeld, which led to
UBS disclosing the identities of clients. 196
The risk-reward scenario for wealthy Americans hiding their money offshore no
longer tips so precipitously in favor of tax havens. 197 As such, some wealthy clients are more

Cornelius J. O'Reilly, An Overview of the IRS's 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, 13 No. 3
BUS. ENTrrEs 20, 20, 24 (2011).
187

188

Id.

189

Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offhore Piggybanks:Defrrraland the Utility of Amnesty, 14 GEO. MASON

L. REv. 667,696 (2007).
190Id. at 696-98.
191 See supra Part III.A.

192See O'Reilly, supra note 187, at 22-23.
193 Schottenstein, supra note 31, at 376-77.
194Id. at377.
195 O'Reilly, supra note 187, at 22; see also PROTOCOL TO THE INCOME TAX TREATY, supra note 129, at 28.

The prior attempts at voluntary disclosure were hampered by the inability of the government to identify nonparticipating individuals who maintained accounts in tax havens. Id.
196See O'Reilly, supra note 187, at 22 (discussing the UBS and U.S. agreement).
197See id. at 24; see also CommissionerDouglas H. Shulman Speaks at the IRS/George Washington University
2 4 h Annual Institute, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Commissioner-Douglas-H.-Shulman-
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likely to act in a risk averse manner and disclose the account to avoid steep penalties. It must
be acknowledged that the IRS has limited resources and not every American with an offshore
account will be investigated or prosecuted, much less discovered. 98
'
A drawback of the program is its limited duration. The 2009 program began in
March and was set to last until September. 199 However, after requests from tax practitioners
and attorneys, a one time extension was granted, moving the deadline to October. 200 One
source stated that over the span of one week "four hundred applicants sought Foreign Bank
Account Reporting .. . forms." 201 With so many people coming forward, it is illogical to
extend the deadline for only one month. The program does not have to run continuously, but
as experienced with the prior deadline, complications can arise from both "logistical and
administrative challenges," such as failure to timely file the paperwork.202 Additional
problems arise when the government engages in multiple amnesty periods. If the U.S.
government continues its pattern of tax amnesty, tax evaders are likely to expect future
amnesty periods and be more resistant to disclosing accounts held overseas. They can
continue evading taxes in the short term and then take advantage of amnesty in the future.20 3
The program was amended again in 2011 to provide an incentive for U.S. taxpayers
to satisfy the outstanding obligations resulting from offshore accounts.2 4 This version has
two primary benefits: the taxpayer avoids criminal charges, and the penalties for failing to file
a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (hereinafter "FBAR") are significantly
reduced. 20 5 The penalties for not filing an FBAR can be quite severe, sometimes even as high
as half the amount in the offshore account.20 6 Taxpayers are required to file an FBAR
disclosing all of their offshore accounts if the aggregate total is above $10,000.207 Voluntary
disclosure is closely linked with FBAR.
E.

Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)

The Bank Secrecy Act requires that U.S. citizens report all financial interests located
in a foreign financial account. 208 The requirement to disclose these offshore accounts reaches
any "United States person [who] had a financial interest in or signature authority over at least
Speaks-at-the-IRS-George-Washington-University-24th-Annual-lnstitute (last updated Aug. 4, 2012) (stating
that U.S. clients now understand that the possibility of avoiding suspicion when hiding money overseas has
declined).
198 Lee & Smiley, supra note 49, at 40.
199 IRS Extends Deadline for Disclosing Hidden Qffshore Accounts, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/Spanish/IRS-Extends-Deadline-for-Disclosing-Hidden-Offshore-Accounts
(last updated
Aug. 3, 2012).
200

201
202

Id.
Daly, supra note 29, at 149.
IRS Extends Deadlinefor DisclosingHidden Offshore Accounts, supranote 199.

203 Boise,

supra note 189, at 703-04.
supranote 187, at 20.
205 Id. at 23.
206 See infra Part III.E. Instead of paying the higher of $100,000 or 50% of the account, there is a one time
204 O'Reilly,

charge of 25% of the account's highest balance from 2003 to 2010. O'Reilly, supra note 187, at 23.
207 Report of ForeignBank and FinancialAccounts (FBAR), supra note 95.
208 Id. Congress created the Bank Secrecy Act to reduce the use of tax havens by U.S. citizens and increase
revenue by cutting back on tax evasion. See Kevin E. Packman & Andrew H. Weinstein, FBAR- ForeignBank

Account Reporting Obligations:A Primerfor the Practitioner,106 J. TAX'N 44, 44 (2007).
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one financial account located outside of the United States; and [t]he aggregate value of all
foreign financial accounts exceeded $10,000 at any time during the calendar year to be
reported." 20 9 It is intended to assist the IRS in identifying individuals who are using offshore
bank accounts to evade U.S. taxes. 210 Foreign banks are not subject to U.S. law and therefore
are not subject to reporting requirements. 211 As such, FBAR seeks to put the onus on U.S.
citizens to report their offshore bank accounts in accordance with U.S. law.
There are exceptions to the reporting requirements, but they are unlikely to affect
wealthy individuals using the foreign accounts to evade taxes.212 The minimal threshold
value of $10,000 in aggregate accounts prevents private bankers from dividing up the assets
into hundreds of smaller accounts. This threshold is low enough to ensure that anyone
moving money overseas with the intent to evade taxes will face reporting requirements. The
penalty for not filing is a monetary fine not to exceed $10,000 per violation. 2 3 However, if
there is reasonable suspicion that the failure to file was done willfully, such as with the intent
to evade taxes, the penalty increases to the greater value of $100,000 or half of the balance in
the account when the violation is discovered.214
By imposing a strict penalty, the FBAR requirements serve as a sufficient deterrent
for moving money into overseas accounts. However, the IRS recognizes ignorance of the law
as a defense by an alleged perpetrator. 21 5 All the alleged perpetrator must do is supply the
IRS with "reasonable cause" for failing to file an FBAR if caught. The taxpayer must simply
state that he was not familiar with this requirement. That lack of knowledge combined with
the complexity of the filing requirements is sufficient to show reasonable cause. 216
With such an easy escape, private bankers often take advantage of the system by
encouraging their clients not to report these offshore accounts. 21 7 The worst case scenario
when failing to disclose the account is discovery by the IRS and a fine. If the person pleads
ignorance of the law and starts filing that year, the penalty will be $10,000. The 50% penalty
209Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), supra note 95.

For the purposes of this

requirement, a financial account "includes, but is not limited to, a securities, brokerage, savings, demand,
checking, deposit, time deposit, or other account maintained with a financial institution." A foreign financial
account is defined as any financial account that is not located within the U.S. As such, an account with
Goldman Sachs that is physically located outside of the U.S. would qualify while an account with UBS located
inside the U.S. would not meet the reporting requirements. Report of ForeignBank and FinancialAccounts,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f9O221.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) [hereinafter
FBAR Forms]. For the purposes of FBAR, a U.S. person includes both citizens and resident aliens. To
determine whether an individual is considered a resident, the substantial presence test can be applied. This test
looks at the number of days the person was present in the U.S. during the current tax year. See Packman &
Weinstein, supra note 208, at 45. A financial interest is one in which "the individual is the owner of record or
has legal title, whether the account is for the owner's benefit or for the benefit of another." Id. at 47.
210Report of ForeignBank andFinancialAccounts (FBAR), supra note 95.
211See id.

212Id. The exceptions include certain types of accounts that are owned jointly by spouses, foreign accounts
owned by governmental entities or international financial institutions, IRA owners, beneficiaries of taxqualified retirement plans, and trust beneficiaries among others. Id.
213FBAR Forms, supranote 209.
214Id. The criminal penalties are steeper; the fine is increased to $250,000 and the perpetrator can be
imprisoned for up to five years. See Packman & Weinstein, supra note 208, at 49.
215Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, and Why it Matters, 7 HOUS.
Bus. & TAX L. J. 1,25 (2006).
216 Id.

217See, e.g., Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Indicted, supranote 114.
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is only present for willfulness and cannot be broached when lack of knowledge is pled.218
Therefore, it is only logical for a private banker to instruct his client to keep the money in an
offshore account free of taxes and, if discovered, plead ignorance, pay the $10,000 fine, and
pay the taxes, which he would have been paying all along.
Despite all the alleged scheming, the truth seems to be that most people are in fact
completely oblivious of the requirement to file an FBAR. 219 The result is an initiative that has
the potential to be successful, but falls short as it is not implemented properly; the regulation
is too obscure and the penalty structure is too lenient to dissuade wealthy Americans.
F.

The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act

The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act is a proposed bill designed to "restrict the use 22
of
'0
offshore tax havens and abusive tax shelters to inappropriately avoid Federal taxation.
The bill was introduced by Carl Levin in the Senate and by Lloyd Doggett in the House of
Representatives in 2005.221 The bill has since been reintroduced in numerous iterations over
the years but has yet to be passed.222 If implemented, the legislation has the potential to
collect billions of currently evaded tax dollars by stifling the use of tax havens by wealthy
individuals. 223 This in turn would lighten the burden on the middle class citizens who have
had to bear the weight of paying extra taxes to support the government. 224
The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act defines tax havens as countries where the secrecy
laws are unreasonably strict and prevent the U.S. from enforcing its laws upon its citizens
who are using banks located in these countries. 225 After defining a tax haven, prior versions
of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act listed nations currently classified as tax havens; a political
move to draw negative attention towards them.2 6 This has since been discontinued in the
current version.227 That negative attention was precisely the drawback of the Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act. Instead of facilitating cooperation like the other initiatives, the purpose of this
measure was to identify and attach a negative reputation to those countries that are not
cooperating internationally. 22 However, this proved ineffective because the reputation that is
stigmatized as a negative trait was actually the very quality that attracted wealthy clients to
those banks and countries. 229 In fact, Singapore is reported to have said that "it will not
budge, despite
pressure to undo its strict bank secrecy provisions" because that is what brings
230
in capital.

211See Sheppard, supra note 215, at 25-26.

Id. at26.
±
Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 2669, 112 Cong. (2011).
221Levin Unveils Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, LEVIN.SENATE.GOV (July 12, 2011), http://www.levin.senate.gov/
219

220

newsroom/press/release/levin-unveils-stop-tax-haven-abuse-act.
222 id.
223Todero, supra note 58, at 258-59.
224 Id. at 260.
225 See id. at 263.
226 See id. at 243-44.
th
227 See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 2669, 112
Cong. (2011) (noting the absence of black listed

countries).
228

Todero, supranote 58, at 242.

229

See id. at 268-69.

230

Id.
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A detailed analysis of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act is beyond the scope of this
Note, however, some of the general provisions focus on giving U.S. authorities more power.
Under the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, the Treasury would be able to take certain steps that
would place a heavier burden on those foreign countries whose actions hinder U.S. tax
enforcement. 231 Additional terms of the agreement seek to apply monetary fines to
corporations and increase the penalties individuals must pay for aiding tax evasion.232
G. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
The purpose of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (hereinafter "FATCA") is
to reduce tax evasion committed by U.S. citizens.233 FATCA places increased burdens on
both U.S. citizens and foreign financial institutions.234 It requires certain U.S. taxpayers to
report their foreign held assets to the IRS.235 It also places more pressure on the foreign
financial institutions to disclose pertinent information to the IRS. 236 FATCA is intended to
"require[] that virtually every financial institution in the world report any accounts held by
Americans., 2 3 7 Instead of the threshold of $10,000 applied under the FBAR requirements,
FATCA requires reporting when a U.S. citizen holds over $50,000 in foreign markets.238
However, the penalty for failure to report remains at $10,000.239
In order for these requirements to take effect, the foreign institution must enter into
an agreement with the IRS by the middle of the year 2013. 24' As a result of the agreement,
the institution must conduct due diligence and report to the IRS all the clients who are U.S.
citizens. 24 ' The incentive
to enter into the agreement is to avoid the 30% withholding tax on
242
all U.S. transfers.

Summary of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act of 2011, LEVIN.SENATE.GOV (July 12, 2011),
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/summary-of-the-stop-tax-haven-abuse-act-of-201 1.
231

232

233

Id.

Summary of Key FATCA Provisions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/

Corporations/Summary-of-Key-FATCA-Provisions (last updated Aug. 4, 2012).
234 See

id.

235

Id.

236

Id. Whereas FATCA places the pressure on the financial institutions, FBAR focuses instead on the

individual taxpayer disclosing his foreign accounts to the IRS. See Report of Foreign Bank and Financial
Accounts (FBAR), supra note 95. The increased pressure is a result of increasing the due diligence banks must
perform to meet the FATCA standards. See FinancialInstitutions and Investment FundsShould PrepareNow
For FATCA, Financial Regulatory Forum Blog, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/financialregulatory-forum/2012/04/04/financial-institutions-and-investment-ftnds-should-prepare-now-for-fatca/
(discussing some of the requirements under FATCA).
237 Mark Scott, Tax Haven Crackdown Creates Opportunitiesjbr Bankers, Dealbk N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 5,
2012, 12:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/crackdown-on-tax-havens-opens-opportunities-forbankers/.
238 Summary of Key FATCA Provisions,supra note 233.
239 Id.

m Id.
241 Id.
242 O'Reilly, supranote 187, at 24.
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Five European nations (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom)
have expressed approval of FATCA. 14' Additionally, those five countries stated their
intentions of enacting similar laws.244 FATCA will be implemented gradually from 2013 to
2017 so that foreign banks do not violate local rules in conforming to the IRS requirements.141
Since it has yet to be implemented, the effects and success will not be known until after 2013
at the earliest. Some estimates say it will take five years from its passage in 2010 for FATCA
to be fully implemented. 246 That estimate assumes that the regulations will not be changed,
which is far from certain. 247
Although FATCA is still in the early stages of its development, many predictions
have been made about the possible repercussions once it takes effect. As a result of the more
stringent regulations of FATCA, it is estimated that over 6 million Americans currently living
outside the U.S. are contemplating denouncing their citizenship.248 This is based on many
foreign banks' concerns that the increased risk of dealing with U.S. citizens through increased
disclosures will no longer be worth the benefit. 249 Instead of monitoring all the new strict
requirements created by the U.S government, some banks feel that targeting customers in
Latin America and Asia is a more efficient use of resources.25 0 The downside will be felt
more by regular citizens not evading taxes, who will now find it more difficult to live and
25
conduct business abroad. '

243John D. McKinnon & Laura Saunders, Foreign Deal on Tax Dodging, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2012, at C2,
availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203315804577211350573490884.html.
244 id.
245 Id.

246See Christopher Chung, FATCA: The IRS's Very Big Stick, Private Equity Beat Blog, WALL ST. J. (June 14,
2012, 2:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2012/06/14/fatca-the-irs-very-big-stick/.
247Id. Peter Schuur of Deveboise & Plimpton LLP stated that "[t]he FATCA rules are still very much a
moving target." This reflects the uncertainty that practitioners face in attempting to meet the FATCA
regulations. Id.
248See Giles Broom, Rich Americans Give Up Their Passports,BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 1, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/59276?type=bloomberg.
In the last year alone 1,780 people
gave up their citizenship. This is compared to the 235 who did so in 2008. See Sanat Vallikappen, U.S.
Millionaires Told Go Away as Tax Evasion Rule Looms, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 8, 2012, 11:46
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05 -08/u-s-millionaires-told-go-away-as-tax-evasion-rulelooms.html. The most high profile example is Eduardo Saverin, the co-founder of Facebook, who stands to
save $67 million in taxes by renouncing his citizenship. See Kathleen Hunter, Schumer Proposes Tax on
People Like Facebook's Saverin, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2012, 8:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-05-17/schumer-proposes-tax-on-people-like-facebook-s-severin.html.
249See Broom, supra note 248. Certain banks have already terminated accounts held by U.S. citizens after
only the announcement of the increased disclosure obligations. Although recent proposals have suggested
ways to reduce the burden, for example, by permitting foreign banks to report the information to their own
governments instead of the IRS, this is unlikely to convince banks that American clients are now worth the
effort. See John D. McKinnon, Treasury Eyes Funds Hidden Overseas, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2012, at A4,
availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444840104577551273844167062.html.
250See Scott, supranote 237; see also Vallikappen, supra note 248 (stating that Bank of Singapore has already
declined millions of dollars from U.S. citizens because of the cost of dealing with FATCA). U.S. citizens are
no longer required for banks to grow business; Asia now has the fastest growing number of millionaires
looking to invest. Id.
251See Vallikappen, supra note 248.
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IV.

REGULATING AND PENALIZING CORRESPONDENT BANKS

Tax havens have become so intertwined in U.S. and European economies that
terminating them is no longer a plausible objective. The system is too big to fail: "[o]ver half
of all world trade passes through tax havens," and the estimated amount of money held
offshore by individuals is around $11.5 trillion. 2
To remedy the revenue drain on the U.S. and other countries, legislation must be
passed at the domestic level, targeting domestic actors. Correspondent banks, such as UBS's
affiliates in the U.S., operate on behalf of parent banks often located in tax havens. 253 These
banks are subject to U.S. jurisdiction and laws, and thus should be the focal point to reducing
tax evasion. 4
The consistent problem with initiatives undertaken to curb the use of tax havens is
that they focus on either the individual with the foreign account or the foreign country.255 The
problem with this approach is that private bankers have demonstrated an ability to circumvent
disclosure requirements. 256 Additionally, Switzerland and other tax haven countries are not
subject to U.S. law. As such, the U.S. can enter into treaties and implement legislation
intended to shame the tax havens, but that does not change the fact that this enterprise is
extremely profitable and will continue.
Instead, focus and pressure need to be applied to the banks that make these
transactions possible.257 The tools for this solution are already in place, but must be refined
and expanded in order to be successful. Currently, the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act
Section 104 requires "U.S. financial institutions that open accounts for foreign entities
controlled by U.S. clients or open foreign accounts in non-FATCA institutions for U.S. clients
'
to report the accounts to the IRS."258
Further, it grants the IRS the authority to place sanctions
259
on foreign financial institutions.
Jurisdiction can be conferred on these foreign institutions
by treating offshore shell corporations as affiliates to the parent corporation even if there is
so-called "independence. ' 26 The sanctions mentioned are the ability to limit the access to
U.S. markets by targeting the correspondent banks operating in the U.S. and by prohibiting
these banks from "conducting transactions with such foreign institutions. ' 261 These initiatives
Tax Havens Cause Poverty, TAX JUSTICE
idcatart-2&langrl (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
252

NETWORK,

http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front content.php?

253See TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3, at 81.
254 See Foreign Banks and the Federal Reserve, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.ny.frb.org
/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed26.html (last updated Apr. 2007).
255 See supra Part III.
256See supra Part III.A.

257See Indictment, United States v. Weil, No. 08-60322, 2008 WL 4898212 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2008) (stating
that the Swiss Bank operates in the Southern District of Florida as well as other locations in the U.S., thereby

conferring jurisdiction).
251See Summary of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act of 2011, supra note 231; Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R.
2669, 112th Cong. § 104 (2011).
259Edward Tanenbaum, The Annual Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act Show, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://www.bna.com/annual-stop-tax-n 12884903413/.
260

PERMANENT

SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

INVESTIGATIONS,

COMMITTEE

ON

HOMELAND

SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, TiE TOOLS AND SECRECY, STAFF REPORT

10 (2006), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subco
the-enablers-the-tools-and-secrecy.

nmittees/investigations/hearings/tax-haven-abuses-

261Tanenbaum, supranote 259.
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are promising in terms of curbing the use of tax havens; however, they are overly broad and
have consequences. The solution must be narrowly tailored to achieve the goal without
creating problems in other sectors of the U.S. economy.
A.

Problems with the IRS's Current Approach

The most recent version of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act requires that:
Any financial institution directly or indirectly opening a bank, brokerage,
or other financial account for or on behalf of an offshore entity ... in a
non-FATCA institution .. .at the direction of, on behalf of, or for the
benefit of a United States person shall make a return according to the
forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.2 2
This statement is overly broad and leaves the door open for private bankers to create
loopholes. The regulation focuses on any financial accounts for offshore entities with a
connection to a U.S. citizen. However, the connection to a U.S. citizen is not always clear
and often difficult to determine, such as when foundations are set up to hide the identity of the
account holder.
Additionally, the proposed penalty of sanctions against these financial institutions,
such as limiting access to U.S. markets through correspondent banks or altogether cancelling
their business in the U.S., would have the opposite effect of that intended. 263 As of 2006,
foreign banking institutions held in excess of $1 trillion worth of assets and "11 percent of the
total commercial banking assets in the United States. ' '2 4 This level of integration into the
U.S. economy simply cannot be removed just to recover $100 billion in lost revenues from
tax evasion. It would merely substitute one problem for another.
The substituted problem alluded to is the increased level of unemployment. Take
UBS for example. UBS operates correspondent banks in the U.S. 265 The proposed penalty of
terminating UBS's operations in the U.S. would significantly hurt UBS considering the U.S.
constitutes 34% of UBS AG's total operating income. 266 However, scaling back UBS's
access to U.S. markets or terminating that access altogether is simply not tenable. For the
year ending 2010, UBS employed over 22,000 people in the U.S.267 Terminating UBS's
involvement in the U.S. would cause 22,000 people to become unemployed.

H.R. 2669 § 104. A "non-FATCA institution" is defined under the Internal Revenue Code Section
7701(a)(5 1) as "any financial institution that does not meet the reporting requirements of section 147 1(b)." Id.
262

§ 102. The reporting requirements under Section 1471 of the Internal Revenue Code require that the institution

maintain information on the holders of each account to determine whether they fall within the reporting
requirements and if so, provide that information to the proper U.S. authorities by conforming to the due
diligence procedures. I.R.C. § 1471 (2006).
263See Tanenbaum, supra note 259. A correspondent bank is defined as "a financial institution that provides

services on behalf of another, equal or unequal, financial institution." Correspondent banks are most often used
when a foreign financial institution wants to expand its business into a foreign country. CorrespondentBank,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/correspondent-bank.asp#axzzlm5SILi3T
(last visited
Sept. 4,2012).
264 ForeignBanks and the FederalReserve, supra note 254.
265 UBS, ANNUAL REPORT,
266
267

supra note 137, at 362-64.

Id. at 297.
Id. at 54.
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This effect will be magnified when the policy is expanded to other financial
institutions operating correspondent banks in the U.S. During a period of economic turmoil,
implementing this strategy would cripple the U.S. economy at the expense of collecting
evaded taxes. Furthermore, the decreased tax revenue from increased unemployment would
offset any gains made through this policy. The goal of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act is to
improve the economic
health of the U.S. and implementation along these lines would have the
268
contrary effect.
B.

Alternatives to Terminating Correspondent Banks

To achieve the desired effect, the correspondent banks should face strict financial
penalties instead of terminating operations. UBS has a business division entitled Wealth
Management Americas that focuses on providing ultra high net worth U.S. citizens with
financial advice. 269 This business segment should be regulated and subject to close review
because private bankers target these individuals to evade taxes. 27 Therefore, there should be
a provision focusing on these ultra high net worth U.S. citizens opening bank accounts with a
correspondent bank in the U.S.
For example, the provision would read:
Any correspondent or affiliate financial institution operating in the United
States, opening a bank, brokerage, or other financial account on the behalf
of a high net worth United States citizen shall perform due diligence to
discover and disclose any foreign accounts that that U.S. citizen has with
that financial institution's affiliates located around the world.27'
The result of this provision would be that when a high net worth U.S. citizen opens
an account with a UBS affiliate in New York, that UBS affiliate is required to check the
records of every UBS affiliate around the world to determine if that client has any other
accounts with the bank, which must then be disclosed to the proper U.S. authorities.272
The rationale behind this proposed addition is that when wealthy Americans want to
access the offshore market they will utilize a bank that they trust and have patronized before
Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 2669, 112 th Cong. (2011) (stating that the bill is designed to
stop U.S. citizens fiom avoiding federal taxation). Reducing the number of people who succeed in avoiding
taxes increases the government revenue and helps the economy. See id.
269 UBS, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 85.
268 See generally Stop

270 See

TAX HAVEN

271 See

Bryan S. Arce, Taken to the Cleaners:Panama"sFinancialSecrecy Laws Facilitatethe Laundering of

BANKS,

supranote 3, at 97.

Evaded U.S. Taxes, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 465,482 (2009). The self-regulation by banking employees can be

complicated and extensive and as a result the due diligence would not be performed as meticulously. In order
to remedy this, restricting the due diligence to subsidiaries and parent banks would provide more responsibility
because the resulting punishment for failing to meet due diligence requirements would fall exclusively on the
bank the employee works for. See id.
272 See generally High Net Worth Individual- HNWI, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
termsi/hnwi.asp#axzzlmxDpMBO7 (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) (defining a high net worth individual as
someone who has more than $1 million in liquid financial assets). Expanding the due diligence requirements to
high net worth individuals instead of only ultra high net worth individuals, those with wealth in excess of $50
million, may expand the difficulty in investigating all of these individuals, but it will also cast a wider net to
provide the opportunity to discover more people evading taxes. See id.
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which then forces disclosure. 273 As it stands, UBS Wealth Management Americas could
provide a streamline into Wealth Management located in Switzerland and the evasion of taxes
with the parent bank. This strategy would require Wealth Management Americas to disclose
any accounts that might exist at UBS in Switzerland. This form of disclosure would constrain
the due diligence of each private banker to manageable levels. If a private banker is expected
to check for any possible accounts in any bank located around the world, the disclosure would
be reduced. Other banks, such as LGT for example, have no incentive to cooperate with UBS
in disclosing confidential client lists or information. 274 This proposed structure on the other
hand would only mandate banks to check with their parent corporation and subsidiaries for
accounts.
If the provision is violated, a steep financial penalty should be levied on the
correspondent bank. The amount of the penalty should be designed to recover a portion of the
$100 billion of lost taxes every year. 275 Therefore, the penalty would serve two functions. It
would deter tax evasion by punishing the banks that willfully violate the tax laws and, it
would recover money from the banks that facilitate tax evasion.
If a UBS bank operating in New York opens an account for an American citizen and
discovers that the client has an offshore account located in Switzerland, that fact must be
reported. Failure to disclose that information would subject that UBS branch in the U.S. to a
strict penalty, such as 25% of the revenue of its Wealth Management business segment. A
penalty that stringent would force UBS AG, the parent company, to choose between
continuing to operate in the U.S. and face the risk of substantial penalties or cut back on
assisting wealthy Americans in evading taxes.276 This essentially would reduce each parent
company to the choice of realizing profits from legitimate business in the U.S. or realizing
profits from sheltering individuals from taxes in Switzerland. Under this system, the IRS
would police the banks because there is no question of jurisdiction and no barriers to
disclosure.277
From the U.S. government's standpoint, the goal is to reduce tax evasion. However,
the alternative is also desirable: there would be increased revenue resulting from the penalties
paid by banks that violate the disclosure requirements. Either way, there is a decrease in the
$100 billion in lost revenues each year because of tax evasion.

See generally Indictment, United States v. Weil, No. 08-60322, 2008 WL 4898212 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 12,
2008) (indicating that bankers were instructed to tell clients of the relationship between the offshore UBS
branches and their influence in the U.S.).
274 See Cain, supra note 23.
273

275

See TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3, at 1.

276 See

generally Tanenbaum, supra note 259 (stating that the IRS should limit a banks access to the U.S.

market as a penalty). The benefit of allowing a bank to reach a decision on its own is the realization of
increased revenue. This method allows the U.S. government to collect the money from the penalty regardless
of what actions the parent company takes. Preventing the bank from operating within the U.S. simply reduces
the revenue of the U.S. with no perceived benefit.
277 See generally Bank-Client Confidentiality,supra note 29 (stating that Switzerland only waives bank client
confidentiality for criminal matters). The IRS does not have to go through the Swiss government in order to
gain access to the accounts because they are located within the U.S. Additionally, in the U.S., tax evasion is a
crime so the IRS would have access to the accounts if there is a suspicion that they are being used for tax
evasion. See Cornell University Law School, supranote 28.
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C. Implementation
i.
Bank Subsidiaries
International banks operate subsidiaries around the world with the goal of
maximizing profit. Therefore, the way to reduce tax evasion and the use of offshore foreign
accounts is to implement a process that makes it unprofitable for the banks to engage in these
transactions.
UBS and LGT have a global presence and operate subsidiaries in many major
economies.
LGT has offices located in Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, China,
Japan, and the U.S., among other smaller financial centers. 279 Similarly, UBS has foreign
branches located in France, Japan, Russia, Italy, Austria, Great Britain, Canada, Australia,
and the U.S., among others. 20 The governments of these countries have jurisdiction over the
subsidiary banks based on their presence in each country and can therefore regulate those
subsidiaries under domestic law. 28 ' The banks that operate in the U.S. and European
countries are obligated to abide by those countries' laws. For example, all foreign branches
of banks that have locations in the U.S. must abide by Federal Reserve regulations.2 2 The
result is a network of domestic laws that have a global impact. Targeting tax evasion through
a global scale is the only viable solution. As a global problem, tax evasion cannot "be
resolved by national means alone.
Solutions require regional and even global mechanisms of
28 3
cooperation and coordination."
Once the U.S. implements the proposed provision above, other countries around the
world theoretically would follow by implementing similar domestic laws. 84 The result would
be an international system implemented on the domestic level through national laws of
participating countries. The foundation for this system has already been laid with five
European countries supporting FATCA and pledging to pass similar legislation. 285
UBS's financial report states that the Wealth Management & Swiss Bank division is
the company's most profitable division for the fiscal year 2010.186 Along with this segment's
278

LGT GROUP, ANNUAL REPORT 48-49 (2011) [hereinafter LGT, ANNUAL REPORT], available at

http://www.Igt.com/shared/.content/media-relations/mediendownloads/Geschaeftsbericht_201 lGroupen.pdf; UBS, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 362-64.
279 LGT, ANNUAL REPORT,

supranote 278, at 48-49.

UBS, ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 137, at 362-64.
281 See generally Browning & Stempel, supra note 79 (stating that the U.S. is arguing that banks that have no
280

formal presence in the country can be subject to jurisdiction through telephone conversations and emails, which

would establish a presence within the U.S.).
282 ForeignBanks

and the FederalReserve, supra note 254.

Graham Allison, The Impact of Globalization on Nationaland InternationalSecurity, in GOVERNANCE
GLOBALIZING WORLD 72, 84 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 2000).
283

284

IN A

See generally McKinnon & Saunders, supra note 243 (stating that governments of five European nations

had the intention of adopting a similar law to FATCA).
285

Id.

286 UBS, ANNUAL REPORT,

supra note 137, at 37. LGT is similar, however for the year 2010 its revenue

stream was far less diversified. LGT received a majority of its revenue, just less than 50%, from Liechtenstein.
The second most profitable country for LGT was Switzerland. The U.S. was third, representing just over 10%
of LGT's revenue. As such, any actions taken by the U.S. to punish LGT located in the U.S. would not have
the same effect as those taken against UBS. As it stands now, any action taken by the U.S. to regulate LGT's
local businesses may not be a determinative factor in ceasing tax abuses by wealthy U.S. clients. That being
said, LGT maintains a majority of its assets, close to 50%, in the Americas and Europe. Consequently, if the
result is as intended, and the U.S.'s actions are followed by countries in Europe, then LGT would have to
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success, UBS operates a less profitable division in the Americas.
This division contributed
the second highest operating income for the fiscal year 2010.288 The total operating income
was composed of 40% from Switzerland and 34% from the U.S., while the rest of Europe was
much further behind, accounting for only 14%.289 Clearly, the U.S. is a significant portion of
UBS's income and losing business in the U.S. would threaten its viability in the future. A
penalty imposed on the revenue from business in the U.S. would certainly put pressure on
UBS to rethink its business strategy.
In fact, this strategy may be able to force UBS into reducing its services that target
wealthy U.S. citizens and thereby reduce tax evasion in the U.S. According to UBS's most
recent financial statement, the Asia Pacific region reported growth in its business from high
net worth clients.2 90 Additionally, UBS is positioned to increase its market share in Asia,
which is considered to be a growing market for high net worth individuals.2 91 An increase in
penalties and cost of doing business in the U.S. could force some of these companies to focus
on the emerging Asian markets and shift away from targeting wealthy clients in the U.S. as
the risk may no longer be worth the reward.292 Although many of the initiatives taken have
sought a global effect, it must not be overlooked that the primary objective is to protect the
U.S. economy.
ii.
Know-Your-Customer Requirements
To properly implement the disclosure requirements of correspondent banks
operating in the U.S. it is necessary to expand the "know-your-customer" requirements to tax
evasion. The purpose of the know-your-customer requirements is to "enable a financial
institution to form a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of each customer and,
with an appropriate degree of confidence, knows the types of business and transactions the
customer is likely to undertake., 293 This includes following the money to track down the
beneficial owner, an important step in discovering if someone is hiding money offshore.29 4
The U.S. generally requires that a financial institution obtain the name, address, date of birth,
and the Taxpayer Identification Number when opening an account. 29 5 It is the responsibility
of each financial institution to determine what level of due diligence is required for each

rethink its business strategy to continue to be a prominent global actor. See LGT, ANNUAL
278, at 52, 66.
287

UBS,ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 137, at 85.

211

Id. at 297.

REPORT,

supra note

Id. The United Kingdom alone represents 9% and the rest of Europe contributes 5% to the total operating
income. See id.
290 See id. at 73; see also Browning, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 2 (confirming the analysis of UBS that
Asia is an emerging market in the offshore world).
289

291 UBS, ANNUAL REPORT,
292

supra note 137, at 75.

See Mathiason, supranote 27.

293 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY
LAUNDERING

AND

TERRORIST

FINANCING

26

(2007),

available

at

http://www.fatf-

gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%2OPrinciples%20and%2OProcedures.pdf.
294 Id. As mentioned in the LGT case, private bankers created trusts that disguised the ownership of the assets
so that clients could avoid paying the taxes they owed in the U.S. See supra Part I.A.
295 John W. Campbell, 'Know Your Customer' Quick Reftrence Guide United States of America, PWC,
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/financial-services/assets/know-your-customer-quick-reference-guide.pdf
(last
updated Jan. 2011).
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customer. 296 The IRS maintains a list of the jurisdictions with approved know-your-customer
requirements.297
After September 11, 2001, banks have increased the scrutiny levels for money
laundering, but have yet to do so for tax evasion. 298 The IRS should require that banks
operating in the U.S. deem the accounts exceeding a certain threshold value to be high risk for
tax evasion and apply increased due diligence. It is reasonable that people with millions of
dollars are of a higher risk of evading taxes than those with only thousands of dollars. 299
In addition to the closer review, financial institutions should be encouraged to file
Suspicious Activity Reports for those suspected of tax evasion. 3 0o The regular use of
Suspicious Activity Reports is restricted primarily to money laundering and terrorist
financing.30 1 The reporting requirements vary by country, but in all countries a report must be
filed when a "threshold of suspicion" is attained.30 2 The requirements should be amended in
the U.S. to reflect the threat of tax evasion. This provision has been proposed in the Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act, but as of yet has not been implemented.3 3 If there is a sharp decrease or
an unexplained gradual decrease in the amount of funds stored in an account then a
Suspicious Activity Report should be filed. The increased taxes resulting from discovering
money transfers before they are moved overseas for the purpose of evading taxes would more
than offset the slight cost of increased due diligence under the lower threshold.
Under the Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering Act, the reporting
requirements focus on money laundering and not tax evasion. 304 The due diligence
requirements force all financial institutions that hold accounts for non-U.S. persons to

296FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 293, at 26.
297

QualfiedintermediaryFrequentlyAsked Questions, supra note 142.

291 See Alvin D. Lodish, How Well Do You Need To "Know Your Customer? ", BANKTECH (Dec. 2, 2003),

http://banktech.com/risk-management/16401323.
299See generally TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 3, at 34-74 (listing high net worth U.S. clients who evaded
taxes by patronizing LGT).
300The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 encourages the filing of suspicious activity in manners relating to money
laundering and tax evasion. See FinCEN's Mandate From Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes regs/bsa/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
301FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 293, at 27. The reporting requirements apply to financial institutions
that operate in the U.S. This includes U.S. branches of foreign banks; hence UBS would be subject to the
reporting requirements. The current requirements specify that a federal criminal violation should be reported
but then specifies that the financial institution must believe that it is a victim of such transaction. Therefore, no
bank is going to report tax evasion because its parent company will be receiving increased business and the
subsidiary will not be perceived as a victim. The instructions to the report specify that transactions of more
than $5,000 should be reported if there is a reasonable suspicion that the funds are from some form of illegal
activity or the transfer is disguising money from an illegal activity. This would preclude tax evasion, which for
the most part is derived from legal activity. See Suspicious Activity Report, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT
NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/forns/files/f9022-47 sar-di.pdf (last updated Mar. 2011).
302FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supranote 293, at 27.
303See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 2669, 112'h Cong. § 206 (2011). Expanding the use of Suspicious

Activity Reports to tax evasion and even civil issues will serve to increase transparency and catch questionable
banking practices. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL

TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 34 (2010).
304 Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
examinations/bsa/bsa 13.html (last updated July 8, 2004).
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establish policies with the aim of detecting money laundering.30 5 These provisions should be
expanded to address tax evasion and U.S. citizens.
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (hereinafter "USA PATRIOT Act") provides
numerous opportunities for the expansion of disclosure to include tax evasion. 116 In the wake
of September 11, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed to enhance the investigation and
subsequent prosecution of international money laundering and other criminal abuses resulting
from international financial transactions. 0 7 Title III specifically focuses on international
money laundering.30 8 Enhanced due diligence is required by a financial institution when
certain factors, such as geography and the nature of the business with an emphasis on funds
transfers and foreign private banking accounts, make a customer a high risk client.30 9 By
incorporating tax evasion as a qualification for high risk and enhanced due diligence, the
discovery of foreign bank accounts would become more prevalent.
In Section 302, the government notes that correspondent banks are susceptible to the
actions of foreign banks in disguising the beneficial owner and thereby facilitating money
laundering. 310 Despite being subject to close review, correspondent banks still participate in
money laundering. Therefore, it stands to reason that correspondent banks participate in tax
evasion, which is subject to lower review and less likely to be discovered.3 ' In order to
increase the discovery of tax evasion, the procedures for detecting money laundering should
be expanded to tax evasion. As such, the purpose of Title III should be amended to include
preventing, detecting, and prosecuting tax evasion. 312 The broader legislation should require
domestic financial institutions to maintain records and obtain the biographical data, identity,
and address of each client, as well as the identity of the beneficial owner, and a description of
the transaction. 31 3 This information which is collected for suspicion of money laundering
could easily be expanded to apply to an American client opening a bank account exceeding a
certain threshold value that would arouse suspicion.
An area that should not be expanded is Section 311, Prohibitions or Conditions on
Opening or Maintaining Certain Correspondent or Payable Through Accounts. Under this
section, the U.S. has the power to prevent or hinder the use of correspondent accounts within
the country by domestic financial institutions, if a bank in a foreign jurisdiction is suspected
of laundering money. 314 As addressed above, this type of action would hinder the U.S.

305 id.
306 See Uniting

and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5301-5332).
307

USA PATRIOT Act, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT

NETWORK,

http://www.fincen.gov/statutes regs/patriot/

index.html (last visited Sept. 5,2012).
308 See generally USA PATRIOT Act § 302.
309 Campbell, supra note 295.
310USA PATRIOT Act § 302.
311 See

id. § 311 (defining a correspondent account as "an account established to receive deposits from, make

payments on behalf of a foreign financial institution, or handle other financial transactions related to such
institution").
312 Title I is currently designed to "prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the
financing of terrorism." Id. § 302.
313 Id. § 311.
314

Id.
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economy.315 In addition, it would be easier for the U.S. government to police wealthy
individuals obtaining wealth management advice from a local bank as opposed to being
contacted directly by private bankers in Switzerland. In the latter case, the U.S. would lack
jurisdiction and have no remedy.
The due diligence requirements for correspondent accounts as explained in Section
312 of the USA PATRIOT Act specify that financial institutions have to establish enhanced
due diligence policies designed to identify instances of money laundering. 316 A section
should be added that focuses on financial institutions adopting enhanced due diligence
policies when opening an account for a U.S. citizen with a local subsidiary of a foreign bank.
The result would be close review over the use of these accounts in an effort to detect tax
evasion and movement of large quantities of money offshore.
Similarly, Section
312(a)(i)(2)(B)(iii) should be expanded to include tax evasion and narrowly tailored to
increase the effectiveness of the due diligence. 317 As it stands now, a financial institution
should take reasonable steps to determine if correspondent banks are providing correspondent
accounts with other foreign banks. 318 Requiring a financial institution to determine if there
are correspondent accounts with any other foreign bank would place a heavy burden on the
correspondent banks. 319 For tax evasion, the measure would be effective
if the correspondent
320
bank simply performed due diligence with its subsidiaries and parent.
The minimum standards for opening a private bank account under Section
312(a)(i)(3)(A) should be expanded to tax evasion. The identity of the beneficial owner and
the source of the funds are important to detect tax evasion. 321 If the source of the funds can be
determined, it would reveal whether the individual is of high net worth and whether this is the
type of client that foreign banks are likely to target to evade taxes.

35 See supra Part IV.A.
316 USA PATRIOT Act § 312.
317See id.

311Id. § 312(a)(i)(2)(B)(iii); see also Ross Q. Panko, Banking on the USA PATRIOT Act: An Endorsement of
the Act's Use of Banks to Combat Terrorist Financingand a Response to its Critics, 122 BANKING L. J. 99, 124
(2005) (stating that Title III permits banks to share customer information with both law enforcement and other
banks if the person is suspected of money laundering). Extending this disclosure to tax evasion would likely be
met with hostility since banks do not want to infringe on customer privacy unless there are "legitimate risks."
Id. However, since tax evasion is not a criminal offense in some countries, the risk may not be viewed as
legitimate. See Mathiason, supranote 27.
319See generally Addison, supra note 6, at 722 (stating that foreign governments need information about the
individuals before releasing any information). The requirements for a private institution in obtaining private
confidential information are likely to be even more onerous if not impossible. See id.
320See generally Indictment, United States v. Weil, No. 08-60322, 2008 WL 4898212 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 12,
2008) (stating that bankers were taught to sell clients on moving money offshore with a UBS account because
the network created net benefits for the U.S.). The bankers specifically stated that UBS creates more jobs in the
U.S. and has better lobbyists than the other foreign banks. This allowed them to protect the account from
disclosure. This suggests a connection between the operations of the correspondent and parent banks. See id.
321 See generally USA PATRIOT Act §§ 312(a)(i)(3)(A) (stating that the identity of beneficial owners and the
source of funds is usefil in detecting and stopping money laundering). Similarly, Section 326 provides
procedures that must be adhered to in order to verify that the person is who they claim to be. Verification is
important in tax evasion because the goal of private bankers is often to hide the beneficial owner of the account
so that it appears to be a non-U.S. entity and then the IRS would have no jurisdiction to collect taxes on that
account. Id. § 326.
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Another provision requires that adequate records be maintained as they have a high
degree of utility in tax investigations. 322 The required data includes the biographical
information and a description of the transaction.3 23 This should be expanded; correspondent
banks should be required to maintain records of all accounts opened because the usefulness in
an investigation may not be immediately apparent, but determined at a later date.
The U.S. should enforce these proposed amendments and additions for foreign
banks operating in the U.S. The enhanced due diligence would reveal more foreign accounts
and reduce tax evasion by imposing a substantial penalty if private bankers assist U.S. clients
324
in moving money overseas. Currently, UBS follows a lax know-your-customer policy.
The policy is limited to criminal actions and as a result, tax evasion would not be a
consideration. 321 Under this policy, banks are required to take reasonable measures to
discover the identity of clients and the beneficial owners of the account.326 That information
includes whether the client is acting alone and who provides the funds.327 This is consistent
328
with the U.S.'s general policy of detecting money-laundering.
Additionally, due diligence includes the reason for opening the account, the
expected activity that will be taking place, the net worth of the individual, and the source of
the funds. 329 The category of net worth is important and should be included in the U.S.'s
standards. Discovering the net worth of an individual assists in determining whether that
person has a propensity to hide money overseas. Individuals with hundreds of millions of
dollars are much more likely to hide money in a Swiss Bank account than a person with
$500,000.330

Banks operating under these guidelines are permitted to define what categories of
people warrant enhanced review. 331 The U.S. should make it mandatory that high net worth
individuals become one such category. If high net worth individuals are omitted from the list
then it is extremely unlikely that any of them would face enhanced review, which would
allow them to continue evading taxes. Overall, the review and due diligence used by these
correspondent banks operating in the U.S. should be amended so that tax evasion is less likely
to occur and more likely to be caught when it does occur.

32212 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2008).
32331 U.S.C. § 5314(a) (2006).
324 WOLFSBERG GROUP, THlE WOLFSBERO GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY-LAUNDERING GUIDELINES FOR PRWATE

BANKNG 1, 2 (2002), available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/WolfsbergAML Guidelines-for

PB(2002).pdf. These guidelines are common to many of the world's largest international banks including
Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and UBS AG. Id.
at 1.
325 Id. at 2.
327

id.
Id.

328

See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 311, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§

326

5301-5332).
329 WOLFSBERG GROUP,

supra note 324, at 3.

See generally TAX HAVEN
net worth citizens).
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BANKS,

supranote 3, at 89-97 (discussing the measures taken to target U.S. high

331 WOLFSBERG GROUP, supra note 324, at 4.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Tax evasion by wealthy individuals has plagued the U.S. economy, especially
during the recent economic decline. There has been no shortage of proposals to remedy this
problem, but to date there have been no long term successes. Tax evasion is an international
predicament and most of the proposed resolutions have targeted a global agenda. The current
initiatives that focus on international actors are flawed. Sovereign nations such as
Switzerland and Liechtenstein have been able to avoid reporting requirements and disclosures
by virtue of strict bank secrecy laws.
To be successful, the answer must be implemented on a domestic level. A senior
anti-fraud official at the OECD stated that "[t]he biggest mistake politicians are making is that
they think if they dry up an oasis the camel won't wall to the next one. 332 Therefore,
provisions must be implemented that dry up the source of revenue for private bankers in the
U.S., forcing them to move to the next fertile source of revenue in another part of the world,
for example, East Asian locations like Hong Kong or Singapore.333
The best way to make the U.S. less attractive to private bankers is to ensure that the
foreign banks cannot earn a profit by operating in the U.S. To achieve this objective the U.S.
should impose regulations and penalties on correspondent banks operating in the U.S.
Correspondent banks are subject to U.S. jurisdiction and must abide by U.S. laws. As a
result, the IRS will be able to address the issue of tax evasion by indirectly punishing foreign
banks while avoiding the barriers associated with bank secrecy laws.
The current proposition of terminating correspondent bank operations in the U.S.
would lead to widespread unemployment and cannot be achieved without bringing substantial
changes to the U.S. banking industry.334 Instead, the correspondent banks should be heavily
fined for violating the disclosure requirements. As a result, the parent bank would be forced
to make the difficult decision of reducing its Wealth Management segment in the U.S. or
continuing operations and face penalties that would severely impair the company's bottom
line.
To increase the effectiveness of this proposition, the requirements for disclosure
must be clarified and expanded. The information collected from every U.S citizen opening an
account with a domestic branch of a foreign bank should mirror that increased scrutiny
required for those suspected of money laundering. Additionally, due diligence should be
restricted to discovering if that individual has any accounts located in tax havens with the
parent or subsidiary banks. These two provisions would place the burden squarely on the
shoulders of the bank and remove complications that would arise from attempting to discover
any accounts the individual has with any bank anywhere in the world.
Despite not curing the ills of tax evasion, the regulations on correspondent banks
would achieve the desired effect; the U.S. government would realize a reduction in the money
lost yearly as a result of tax evasion and the foreign banks would likely determine that the

332Mathiason, supranote 27.
333See id.; see also Browning, Swiss Banking Secrecy, supra note 2 (stating that with the increased pressure on
Switzerland, high net worth individuals are shifting their attention to Singapore and Hong Kong); see also
Laura Saunders, Hiding Money in Havens Isn't as Easy as It Used to Be, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2012, at A9,
availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303302504577325991580102990.html.
334 See Foreign Banks and the Federal Reserve, supra note 254 (stating that 11% of the total commercial
banking assets are held by foreign institutions).
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U.S. restrictions are not worth the trouble and begin targeting ultra high net worth individuals
elsewhere.
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